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JURISDICTION 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this Petition for Review under § 78-2a-
3(2)(a) of the Utah Code as Petitioner seeks review of final orders resulting from formal 
adjudicative proceedings of the Utah Insurance Department, an agency of the State of Utah. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED 
A. ISSUES PRESENTED. 
The following issues are presented by this Petition for Review: 
1. Did the Insurance Department deny due process of law to the Petitioner when 
it shifted the burden of proof at trial to him to defend his license? 
This issue was presented by the Petitioner to the agency at R. at 298. 
2. Was the Presiding Officer decision not supported by substantial evidence 
where the findings that Petitioner sold unauthorized insurance are based solely on 
unsupported opinion testimony and not on substantive law or agency rules? 
This issue was presented by the Petitioner to the agency at R. at 298. 
B. STANDARD OF REVIEW. 
"Judicial review of final agency actions is governed by the Utah Administrative 
Procedures Act." Viktron/Lika Utah v. Labor Comm % 2001 UT App 8, % 5, 18 P.3d 519. 
With regard to the issues in this case, under § 63-46b-16(4) of the Utah Code, relief may be 
granted only if, based on the agency's record, the Court detemiines that a party seeking 
1 
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review was substantially prejudiced because the agency action was unconstitutional, or was 
"based on a determination of fact that is not supported by substantial evidence when viewed 
in light of the whole record before the court." Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(a),(g)(1953 
as amended). 
Whether an agency action is unconstitutional is a general law question, and because 
questions of general law are reviewed under a correction of error standard, Savage Indus, v. 
Tax Comm'n, 811 P.2d 664, 669-70 (Utah 1991), constitutional challenges to agency action 
would be likewise be subject to correction of error review. See Questar Pipeline v. Tax 
Comrn 'n, 817 P.2d 316, 318 (Utah 1991). Further, in applying the substantial evidence test 
to detemiine whether the Agency correctly determined the factual basis for revocation of the 
license, the Court reviews the whole record before it. See Grey Sterling Company v. Board 
of Review, 776 P.2d 63 (Utah App. 1989). The Petitioner must marshal all of the evidence 
supporting the findings and show that despite the supporting facts, and in light of the 
conflicting or contradictory evidence, the Agency's findings are not supported by substantial 
evidence. See Intermountain Healthcare, Inc. v. Board of Review, 839 P.2d 841 (Utah App. 
1992). 
DETERMINATIVE LAW 
The resolution of the appeal is controlled by the Due Process Clauses of the United 
States and Utah Constitutions, found at Addendum F. Statutes and rules of central 
2 
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importance include U.C. A. § § 31 A-1 -301 (63) and (125), U.C. A. § 58-59-305 and R590-160-
5(10) of the Utah Administrative Code. See Addenda C, D, and E. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE. 
Petitioner was a licensed insurance agent whose license was revoked by the Utah 
Department of Insurance. Petitioner seeks here judicial review of the proceedings which 
resulted in the revocation of his license. 
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS. 
On February 6, 2002, the Utah Department of Insurance gave Ide notice of formal 
adjudicative proceeding and pre-hearing conference. (R. at 6). There were some pre-hearing 
motions and scheduling matters that were resolved and a hearing was held on April 24,2002 
before Mark E. Kleinfield, Administrative Law Judge. (R. at 108). The Presiding Officer, 
Mr. Kleinfield, issued an order/decision on that hearing dated April 30, 2002. (R. at 102). 
Mr. Ide then brought an agency Petition for Review as provided by § 63-46b-13 of the Utah 
Code. That review resulted in affimiing the decision of the Presiding Officer in an Order 
dated October 31, 2002. (R. at 382). 
0$ November 22, 2002, Ide filed a Petition for Review with this Court. 
3 
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C. STATEMENT OF FACTS. 
Gerald Ide was originally licensed to sell insurance in 1976. (R. at 403, 115). No 
license action had ever been taken against him prior to the current circumstances. (R. at 403, 
115). Ide concentrated his insurance sales through a firm known as National Care Marketing 
offering products of health and life insurance. (R. at 403, 116). 
In December, 2001, the Insurance Commissioner issued a cease and desist order 
against Ide and others for assisting an unauthorized insurance business in Utah. (R. at 128). 
Ide did not resist the cease and desist order and believed himself to also be a victim of the 
circumstances that led to the order, as he had enrolled his own daughter in the program that 
turned out to be unauthorized insurance. (R. at 403, 117-123). Ide was surprised by this 
legal problem and voluntarily contacted the few policy holders to whom he had sold the 
product and personally paid their health insurance claims that had arisen. The payments 
were made out of his own pocket and he unwound the few policies he had sold. (R. at 403, 
121-122). 
Toward the end of December, 2001, Ide began promoting the sale of a product known 
as "Privilege Care". (R. at 403,123). Two Insurance Department investigators, Hansen and 
Taylor, visited Ide on January 24, 2002. Hansen testified Ide was told in that meeting that 
Privilege Care was not going to be approved and that it was unauthorized insurance. (R. at 
403, 23). Ide disputes that representation. (R. at 403, 158). 
4 
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Ide did market Privilege Care after meeting with the investigators but did it with the 
understanding that he was selling a healthcare plan under a Professional Employer's 
Organization (PEO) which is not an insurance product and, thus, is regulated outside of the 
insurance code. (R. at 403, 128-138). 
The Utah Insurance Commissioner brought this action for license revocation against 
Ide for marketing Privilege Care as an unauthorized insurance product. Ide argued at his 
license revocation hearing and here that the Privilege Care product has never been shown to 
be insurance, and the ruling was based on the Presiding Officer requiring him to prove that 
Privilege Care was not insurance instead of placing the burden of proof on the state to prove 
that he was selling unauthorized insurance contrary to law. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Petitioner Ide shows the Court in this brief that he was denied due process in his 
license revocation hearing in that rather than requiring the Department of Insurance to show 
that unauthorized insurance had been sold, the Presiding Officer found that Ide had failed to 
show the Privilege Care product was outside insurance regulation, thereby shifting the 
burden of proof to him to defend his license. 
Ide also shows in this brief that the decision is not supported by substantial evidence. 
Rather than affinnatively prove that the Privilege Care product was unauthorized insurance 
sold contrary to law, the Presiding Officer based his decision to revoke the insurance license 
5 
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on the opinion of potential consumers and two department investigators that had done no 
study of the structure of the product to see if it met the definition of insurance. While one 
may correctly state that there was evidence to support the decision, a close look at that 
evidence shows that it consists entirely of unsupported opinion. By contrast, Ide presented 
affirmative testimony that the product he sold was an unregulated PEO product. 
ARGUMENT 
A. INTRODUCTION. 
The insurance agent license of Gerald Ide was revoked because the Presiding Officer 
found that Ide had engaged in the sale of unauthorized insurance. Ide's defense was that the 
product he was selling was participation in a Professional Employer's Organization or PEO. 
A good understanding of the difference between insurance and a PEO is important to 
understanding why the Presiding Officer decided the case incorrectly. 
The Utah Code provides insurance-related definitions in § 31 A-1-301. The full text 
is given in Addendum D to this brief, but insurance is defined in § 31 A-1-301(63) as an 
arrangement, contract, or plan for the transfer of a risk or risks from one or more persons to 
one or more other persons or for a distribution of risk among a group of persons. Subsection 
(125)(a) defines an unauthorized insurer as one not holding a valid certificate of authority to 
do insurance business in the state or transacting business not authorized by a Certificate of 
Authority. See Addendum D. 
6 
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The Utah Code also provides for the existence of Professional Employer 
Organizations under the Professional Employer Organization Licensing Act found at Title 
58, Chapter 59 of the Utah Code. Of particular importance in this appeal is § 58-59-305 
which specifically provides that a PEO not domiciled in this state and employing less than 
25 employees within the state is exempt from licensing. See Addendum E. 
This brief demonstrates that the burden of proof for showing cause for revocation of 
Ide's license for the sale of unauthorized insurance is on the insurance department. Ide 
presented prima fascie evidence that he was selling PEO memberships. That evidence 
remains unrebutted. The Insurance Department never established by competent proof that 
the Privilege Care program was unauthorized insurance within the definition of the Utah 
Code. Instead, the court will observe from what is explained herein, that the Presiding 
Officer held that Ide failed to prove he was marketing a PEO product and, therefore, it had 
to be unauthorized insurance. That analytical framework, not supported by substantial 
evidence, constitutes a denial of due process by shifting the burden of proof to Ide. 
B. DUE PROCESS WAS DENIED BY SHIFTING THE BURDEN OF PROOF TO 
IDE. 
An appellate court, in reviewing an agency action, shall grant relief if, based on the 
agency's record, the agency action is unconstitutional. U.C.A. § 63-46b-16(4)(a). The 
agency's action in revoking Mr. Ide's insurance license in this case amounts to a deprivation 
7 
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of a constitutionally-protected property interest without due process of law, under both the 
Utah and the Federal Constitutions. U.S. Const, amend. XIV, § 1; Utah Const., art. I, § 7. 
The due process clause of the Utah Constitution provides that u[n]o person shall be deprived 
of life, liberty or property, without due process of law." See id. The Utah Supreme Court 
held, in Untermeyer v. State Tax Commission, 129 P.2d 881, 885 (Utah 1942), that Utah's 
constitutional due process guarantee is "substantially the same" as the due process 
guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution. 
Procedural due process is available only to parties that can establish the existence of 
a recognized property or liberty interest. See Stidham v. Peace Officer Standards and 
Training, 265 F.3d 1144, 1149-50 (10th Cir. 2001), (citing Setliffv. Mem 'IHosp., 850 F.2d 
1384, 1394 (10th Cir. 1988) (citations omitted)); see also Wells Fargo Armored Service v. 
Georgia Public Service Comm'n, 547 F.2d 938, 941 (5th Cir. 1977) (Due Process Clause 
protects only against a deprivation of liberty or property interests). In this case, Mr. Ide's 
insurance license is a recognized property interest, and revocation of that license may not be 
had without affording Mr. Ide due process of law. The Presiding Officer, however, denied 
Mr. Ide his procedural due process rights by improperly shifting the burden of proof, thus 
requiring that Mr. Ide prove there was no violation of the Insurance Code. 
8 
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1. An Insurance License Is A Constitutionally-Protected Property Interest. 
A license to practice one's calling or profession is a protected property right. See Bell 
v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539 (1971). In Bell, the Court found that once a license is issued, 
its continued possession may become essential to the pursuit of one's livelihood. See id. 
Suspension of a license, according to the Court, involves state action and may not be had 
absent the procedural due process required by the Fourteenth Amendment. See id. at 539. 
The Utah Supreme Court, In Re Worthen, 926 P.2d 853, 877 (Utah 1996), 
acknowledged that a professional license constituted a property right. There, the Court 
remarked that Utah courts never hesitate to consider allegations of due process violations 
"when professionals risk losing their professional license or means of employment through 
the action of a public disciplinary body." Worthen, 926 P.2d at 877. 
The insurance license held by Petitioner, Gerald Ide, then, is a constitutionally-
protected property interest. Mr. Ide has been licensed to sell insurance since 1976. (R. at 
403, 115). Prior to the incidents giving rise to the current circumstances, no action had ever 
been taken against his license. (R. at 403, 115). Continued possession of his insurance 
license is essential to the pursuit of his livelihood. (R. at 403, 64). (See also, R. at 403,142). 
Therefore, Mr. Ide's insurance license is a constitutionally-protected property interest, 
deprivation of which may not be had absent due process. 
9 
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2. Procedural Requirements of a License Revocation Hearing. 
Proceedings to revoke an existing license are formal adjudicative proceedings 
conducted pursuant to the provisions of § 63-46b-8 of the Utah Code. Utah Admin. Code 
R590-160-4(2) (2002). See Addendum C. In these formal proceedings, the Presiding Officer 
regulates the course of the hearing so as to obtain full disclosure of relevant facts, and to 
afford the parties reasonable opportunity to present their positions. U.C.A. § 63-46b-8(l)(a). 
All parties to a formal proceeding must be afforded the opportunity to present evidence, 
argue, respond, cross-examine witnesses, and submit rebuttal evidence. U.C.A. § 63-46b-
8(1 )(c). Before an insurance license may be suspended or revoked in such a proceeding, the 
Department of Insurance must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, all issues of 
fact—in this case, that the Privilege Care program was unauthorized insurance. See 
Addendum C. 
3, Due Process Was Denied by Improperly Shifting the Burden of Proof to 
Petitioner. 
The Due Process Clause prevents a state from depriving a party of a protected 
property interest without a fair trial in a fair tribunal. See Bunnell v. Industrial Comm % 740 
P.2d 1331, 1333 (Utah 1987); Stivers v. Pierce, 71 F.3d 732, 741 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing//? 
re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955)). This fairness requirement applies not just to the 
courts, but to state administrative agencies charged with applying eligibility criteria for 
10 
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licenses as well. See id.; see also Gibson v. Benyhill, 411 U.S. 564, 578-79 (1973). The 
hearing that ended in revocation of Mr. Ide's insurance license was not a fair hearing. The 
Presiding Officer unfairly shifted the burden of proof from the Insurance Department to Mr. 
Ide, thereby denying him the procedural safeguards of "a fair trial in a fair tribunal," which 
are guaranteed by the Due Process Clauses of both the Utah and Federal Constitutions. 
Here, the Department of Insurance had the burden of proving, by a preponderance of 
the evidence, that each element of insurance, under the Utah Code, was present in the 
Privilege Care program. See Addendum C. In other words the Department of Insurance had 
to prove that the Privilege Care program sold by Mr. Ide was unauthorized insurance, and 
not a PEO. Instead, however, the Presiding Officer shifted the burden back to Mr. Ide, and 
required him to prove that Privilege Care was not insurance. (R. at 120, |^ 9). By improperly 
shifting the burden, the Presiding Officer denied Mr. Ide procedural due process, which 
resulted in a deprivation of his constitutionally-protected property interest in his insurance 
license. See Nelson v. Jacobsen, 660 P.2d 1207, 1212 (Utah 1983); Appleman, Insurance 
Law and Practice § 10413 (1982) (there must exist circumstances upon which to base 
conclusions), citing Sterling Ins. Co. v. Commonwealth, 78 S.E. 2d 691 (1053). 
Due process was denied here because the Order and the logic contained therein bases 
a substantial portion of the decision on the failure of Mr. Ide to establish ERISA exemption 
for the Privilege Care product. (R. at 120, j^ 9). The hearing officer, in his Order, incorrectly 
11 
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maintains that at the hearing Mr. Ide argued for an ERISA exemption. Faced with the nearly-
impossible task of proving a negative, one can search the entire trial transcript and identify 
not a single place where Mr. Ide presented evidence or argument that placed any import 
whatsoever on ERISA. This conclusion is completely without evidentiary support, and 
exposes the hearing officer's presupposition that Mr. Ide need address concerns about 
ERISA. 
Put succinctly: (1) Mr. Ide presented evidence that he became involved in a PEO 
program; (2) Mr. Ide had a very limited understanding of what the PEO program was; and 
(3) at no time did Mr. Ide understand the PEO program to be insurance. Nothing in Title 58, 
Chapter 59, which governs PEO programs, would seem to suggest that one must show that 
a particular PEO program is ERISA-related. In fact, according to § 58-59-305, a PEO with 
less than 25 employees that is not domiciled in the state need not meet any licensing 
requirements. See Addendum E. 
For the Presiding Officer to then turn around and require Mr. Ide to show ERISA 
compliance is, in effect, to create a new PEO requirement not found in § 58-59-305. See 
Nelson, 669 P.2d at 1212 (to satisfy due process, parties must be adequately informed of the 
specific issues they must be prepared to meet); see also, Mangone v. U-Haul International, 
Inc., 7 P.3d 189 (Colo. App. 2000) (holding that when a regulatory statute imposes a 
sanction, due process requires the statute to be reasonably clear as to what conduct lies within 
12 
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its scope); Appleman at § 10413 (statutory provisions are mandatory; commissioner has no 
discretion to impose any other requirements as a condition precedent). In other words, a 
PEO in Utah need not meet the licensing requirements if it has less than 25 employees in the 
state; a PEO is exempt from regulation by the Department of Insurance. Therefore, ERISA 
has no relevance to this proceeding. 
The obligation of the Insurance Department in lifting Mr. Ide's license was: (1) to 
show that Privilege Care was an insurance program; and (2) to procedurally rebut the 
affirmative statements of the Privilege Care executive's testimony that it was a PEO. The 
Insurance Department clearly failed to meet its burden. The hearing officer reached the 
conclusion that the program was not an exempt PEO simply by saying that Mr. Ide failed to 
prove ERISA qualification. That is not an element in Title 58, Chapter 59. The decision 
assumes that if Privilege Care is not a PEO, then it must be insurance. By shifting the burden 
to Mr. Ide to prove a negative, the agency abandoned all procedural safeguards, thus 
depriving Mr. Ide of his constitutionally-protected property interest in his insurance license, 
without due process of law. In revoking Mr. Ide's insurance license, then, the agency action 
was unconstitutional as applied in this case. 
13 
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C. REVOCATION IS NOT SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE. 
1. The Legal Standard. 
Central to the revocation of Ide's insurance agent license was the factual 
determination that he had engaged in the sale of unauthorized insurance. The sale of 
unauthorized insurance is a factual determination which must be supported by substantial 
evidence as required by U.C.A. § 63-46b-16(4)(g). This Court has earlier defined substantial 
evidence as that quantum and quality of relevant evidence that is adequate to convince a 
reasonable mind to support a conclusion. See Caster v. West Valley City, 2001 Ut. App. 212, 
20 P.3d 22. 
The determination of whether substantial evidence exists includes looking at the 
factual determination in light of the whole record before the court, including evidence 
contrary to the decision. See Westside Dixon Associates, LLC v. Utah Power & Light, 2002 
Ut. 31, 44 P.3d 775. However, the appealing party challenging the findings of fact must 
marshal all of the evidence supporting the findings and show they do not measure up to 
substantial evidence. See Whitear v. Labor Commission, 973 P.2d 982 (Utah App. 1998). 
What follows is a marshaling of the facts and a showing that those facts do not 
constitute substantial evidence to reach the conclusion that unauthorized insurance was being 
sold to justify the revocation of Ide's livelihood. 
14 
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2. Marshaled Facts. 
The ultimate fact at issue in this appeal is whether Gerald Ide sold unauthorized 
insurance. The findings of fact of the Presiding Officer assist in marshaling the evidence as 
they form the factual basis upon which a conclusion was made that Ide violated the law. 
Petitioner presents the following facts with reference to the record as required: 
1. Five Star Marketing was included in the cease and desist order of 
December 6, 2001 and Privilege Care had administrators that were involved in Five Star 
Marketing. (R. at 108-09). 
2. Ide contacted Karen Wilburg of Santaquin, Utah on January 8,2002 for 
the purpose of marketing Privilege Care, and took money from her as an initial payment. She 
believed she was buying health insurance. (R. at 109, ^ j 15). 
3. Ide was told by investigators Taylor and Hansen on or about January 
24, 2002 that they believed Privilege Care was not underwritten by the Union Labor Life 
Insurance Company as it claimed and Privilege Care was an unauthorized insurer. (R. at 109, 
116). 
4. On January 25, 2002, Ide contacted Kirk Miller and marketed the 
Privilege Care program to him; Miller believed it was health insurance. (R. at 109, ^ f 17). 
5. On January 29, 2002, Ide contacted insurance agent Doug Milne and 
provided him the application form and infomiation about Privilege Care to enroll a client of 
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Mr. Milne. This client had previously been written an Employer's Mutual, LLC policy, the 
organization that was ordered to cease and desist under the prior order. (R. at 109, ^ | 18). 
6. Privilege Care claimed to be underwritten by the Union Labor Life 
Insurance Company but was, in fact, not. (R. at 109, ^ f 19). 
7. Included as evidence was the contractual agreement for Privilege Care 
which the Presiding Officer interpreted to be insurance. (See Order on Hearing at ftn. 3, p. 
21atR. 122). 
8. State investigators Taylor and Hansen reviewed some Privilege Care 
literature and were of the opinion the Privilege Care program was an insurance program. ( 
R. at 403, 32, 66). 
3. Substantial Evidence Does Not Exist Here. 
Before looking at the problems associated with each individual fact relied upon by the 
Presiding Officer, there are some significant general problems with the agency finding a sale 
of unauthorized insurance. First, the agency has no rules defining unauthorized insurance. 
One has to look to the definition of insurance contained in U.C.A. §§ 31A-1-301(63) and 
(125) to find what facts are needed to support a revocation of the agent license. See 
Addendum D. 
Looking at the definitions of "insurance" and "unauthorized insurer," it becomes 
readily apparent that the insurance department needed to prove that Ide was selling an 
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arrangement, contract, or plan that transferred risk, and that product came from someone who 
was required to have an insurance certificate of authority. An examination of the marshaled 
facts shows that not only do the facts not support a finding of sale of unauthorized insurance, 
but they ignore the requirement that these elements be shown in order to revoke the insurance 
license. 
Turning to the marshaled facts viewed in light of the entire record, the evidence is far 
below substantial. First, one of the primary grounds recited for supporting the decision is 
that the persons to whom the Privilege Care program was marketed believed they were 
buying health insurance. (R. at 122, n. 3). Nothing in the Utah Code or in case law suggests 
that because a consumer believes they are purchasing health insurance that the product at 
issue becomes health insurance. (R. at 403,31-37). Such reasoning strains all logic, yet that 
is what the Presiding Officer did here. Insurance has a specific defined meaning in the Utah 
Code, and the opinion of any consumer is not part of that definition. Either there was a 
program that shifted risk within the meaning of insurance and which was outside the PEO 
statutes, or there was not. This supposed supporting fact of consumer opinion is actually 
meaningless and has no weight in finding substantial evidence. 
Next, considerable weight was given to the opinions of the two investigators in 
testifying that the PEO product was unauthorized insurance. Cross-examination of those 
witnesses, found at R. at 403, 29, 42, 48, 64, 74, makes very clear that the opinions were 
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founded on virtually nothing beyond the fact that the investigators did not like the Privilege 
Care product. They had no standard at all by which to gauge what constitutes insurance 
beyond the defining statute. The investigators admitted that the department did not have a 
position on the particular product and denied that they spoke for the Insurance Department 
in defining an insurance product. (R. at 403, 32). The investigators also admit on cross-
examination that while they looked at some literature, they made no study of Privilege Care. 
They did not look at the contract of sale to determine if it was an insurance policy. (R. at 
403,70-72). They did not look at the corporate organization, nor did they interview anybody 
associated with Privilege Care to determine whether the product met the definition of 
allocating risk so as to constitute insurance. A reading of their entire testimony shows that 
the investigators simply opined that Privilege Care looks like insurance to them without any 
factual basis behind that opinion. (R. at 403, 16-46, 56-75). 
What is needed by the insurance department to sustain this decision is a specific 
finding that the Privilege Care product allocates risk as defined by the insurance code. 
Otherwise, the body of evidence is to have an unrebutted defense that the product is a PEO 
as established by the testimony of Michael Garnett. (R. at 403,91-97). Mr. Garnett testified 
that he is the senior vice president for regulatory compliance with Privilege Care. He 
testified affirmatively that Privilege Care is a PEO. He explained how the PEO works. (R. 
at 403, 91-97). Nothing of evidence countered that beyond the opinion of consumers and 
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investigators that did not study the structure of the Privilege Care product. The Presiding 
Officer, in his order on hearing, simply begs the question of whether the product meets the 
statutory definition of insurance and calls Privilege Care insurance without any evidence of 
risk allocation having been presented. See, for example, Finding No. 15 at R. at 109 wherein 
Privilege Care is labeled "healthcare insurance" with virtually nothing but the opinion of a 
lay consumer to establish that vital fact. 
4. Summary. 
Applying the substantial evidence test of whether this opinion evidence constitutes 
the quantum and quality of evidence adequate to convince a reasonable mind to support a 
conclusion, the decision of the Presiding Officer cannot be upheld. 
What supports the license revocation as to whether unauthorized insurance was 
marketed is merely the opinion of a couple of consumers and the opinion of two investigators 
who made no study to determine whether the program was, in fact, insurance under Utah law. 
The investigators admitted they did not have authority to speak for the Insurance 
Commission in labeling a particular product insurance. 
The Presiding Officer found, at Fact No. 17, that Ide was not a good agent and was 
"out of his element" in marketing Privilege Care with probably an incomplete understanding 
of how those kinds of products work. (R. at 122). Ide's understanding or lack of 
understanding of what he was marketing does not make a non-insurance product insurance, 
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and certainly does not constitute evidence of what is insurance. Absent specific affirmative 
proof that an insurance product was marketed, it can never be said that the core conclusion 
that Privilege Care was unauthorized insurance is supported by substantial evidence. Giving 
Ide the administrative death penalty under such circumstances cannot be sustained. 
On the other hand, the Michael Garnett testimony was an affirmative direct 
explanation that Privilege Care was a PEO not subject to insurance licensing under Utah law. 
The Presiding Officer chose to simply disregard that testimony without the presentation of 
any evidence whatsoever that what was said by Garnett was untrue. It is not as if the 
Presiding Officer made a factual choice between conflicting evidence. He made his choice 
based on the opinion of investigators that had studied practically nothing about how Privilege 
Care was organized and how its product worked, and a senior corporate official of Privilege 
Care that explained the program in some detail as a PEO. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should reverse the Insurance Department decision to revoke the Insurance 
Agent License of Gerald Ide and order its reinstatement for the reasons stated herein. 
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DATED this / / ( lay of-MaSi; 2003. 
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN, P.C. 
Gregoj^r/pafitiers 
Margaret R. Wakeham 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
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ADDENDUM 
A. Order on Hearing A-1 
B. Order on Review A-31 
C. R590-160-4(2) of the Utah Administrative Code 
R590-160-5(10) of the Utah Administrative Code A-41 
D. U.C.A. § 31A-1-301(63) and (125) A-45 
E. U.C.A. Title 58, Chapter 59 A-49 
F. Due Process Clauses A-61 
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Order on Hearing 
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BEFORE THE INSURANCE COMMISSIONER 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
COMPLAINANT: 
UTAH INSURANCE DEPARTMENT 
RESPONDENT: 
GERALD G. IDE 
111 East 5600 South, Suite 208 
Murray, UT 84107 
License No. 51030 
ORDER ON HEARING 
(Formal Hearing) 
DOCKET No. 2002-007-HL 
Mark E. Kleinfield, 
Presiding Officer 
FILE COPY 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
THIS MATTER, concerning whether Respondent's insurance agent license should be 
revoked based on Respondent's alleged assistance in doing of an unauthorized insurance 
business, came on to be heard before the Commissioner of the Utah State Insurance 
Department ("Department") on the 24th day of April, 2002 at 9:00 o'clock A. M. 
Mountain Time, with Mark E. Kleinfield, Administrative Law Judge, serving as 
designated Presiding Officer. 
Said hearing being held at the Department's offices located at the Utah State Office 
Building, Room 3110, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, having been convened at the 
designated time of 9:00 A. M., April 24th, 2002 and adjourned at 1:47 P. M. on said same 
day. 
Appearances: 
M. Gale Lemmon, Enforcement Counsel, Attorney for Complainant, Utah State 
Insurance Department, State Office Building, Room 3110, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114. 
Gregory J. Sanders, Kipp & Christian, P. C , Attorney for Respondent, 10 Exchange 
Place, 4th Floor, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111. 
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By the Presiding Officer: 
Pursuant to a March 20th, 2002 Pre-Hearing Conference Order a hearing was 
conducted on April 24th, 2002 in the above-entitled proceeding. The Respondent was 
present at that time. 
The hearing was convened and conducted as a formal hearing in accordance with 
Utah Code Ann. Sections 63-46b-6, 63-46b-7,63-46b-8, 63-46b-9 and 63-46b-10 and 
Administrative Rule R590-160-6. 
ISSUE, BURDEN and 'STANDARD OF PROOF" 
1. The basic issue(s) in this case is (are): 
a. Whether the Respondent violated the terms of the Commissioner's December 6th, 
2001 Cease and Desist Order and or Section 31A-15-102, U. C. A., 1953, as amended, 
by assisting in the doing of an unauthorized insurance business!; and 
b. And if so is revocation of Respondent's license or a lesser penalty the appropriate 
penalty? 
(SEE also Paragraph 2 under DISCUSSION-ANALYSIS.) 
2. The "burden of proof' or "burden of going forward" in this case as to the above 
issue(s) is on the Complainant Department. 
3. As per Utah Administrative Code Rule, R590-160-5.J as to the above and foregoing 
"issue(s)" or "question(s)" to be answered the "standard of proof as to issues of fact is 
to be proven by a "preponderance of the evidence". 
The Complainant offered an opening statement. The Respondent waived opening 
statement. 
Thereafter, evidence was offered and received. 
SUMMARY OF THE EVIDENCE 
Witnesses: 
For the Complainant Department: 
1. Doug Milne, Insurance Agent, 9583 Shoshone Circle, Sandy, Utah 84092. 
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2. Brian Hansen, Market Conduct Examiner, Utah Insurance Department, State Office 
Building, Room 3110, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114. 
3. Kirk C. Miller, Insured Consumer, 1601 Pony Express Way, Centerville, Utah 
84014. 
4. Joe Taylor, Market Conduct Examiner, Utah Insurance Department, State Office 
Building, Room 3110, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114. 
5. Karen Wilbert, Insured Consumer, 516 East 450 South, Santaquin, Utah 84655. Ms. 
Wilbert testified via telephone ((801) 754-5045). 
For the Respondent: 
1. Michael E. Garnett, Senior Vice-president, Privilege Care PEO, 110 Monte Aveue, 
Suite 209, Moorestown, New Jersey 08057. Mr. Garnett testified via telephone ((609) 
685-6122). 
2. Gerald G. Ide, Respondent, 111 East 5600 South, Suite 708, Murray, Utah 84107. 
All of whom were sworn and testified. 
Exhibits: 
The Complainant Department offered the following exhibits: 
1. Complainant's Exhibit No. 1, consisting of seven (7) type written or printed 
pages, being a copy of a December 6th, 2001 Cease and Desist Order issued in Docket 
No. 2001-242-HL, Utah Insurance Department, Complainant, Employers Mutual, LLC, 
et al, including "JERRY IDE, License No. 51030, 111 E. 5600 S., Suite 208 Murray, UT 
84107". 
2. Complainant's Exhibit No. 2, consisting of one (1) type written or printed page, 
being a copy of a January 7, 2002 letter from Five Star Marketing, 1113 Edgefield Drive, 
Piano, Texas 75075 to Consultants & Managers. 
3 Complainant's Exhibit No. 3, consisting of sixteen (16) type written or printed 
pages, being a copy of various documents regarding Privilege Care and Five Star 
Marketing, including application form, contractual agreement, new business turn-in 
form, medical questionnaire, etc. 
4. Complainant's Exhibit No. 4, consisting of two (2) type written or printed pages, 
being a copy of (page 1) a February 5, 2002 letter from Gerald G. Ide to Brian Hansen, 
Utah State Insurance Department, Salt Lake City, Utah regarding Fax to Five Star 
Marketing, and a copy of (page 2) a February 4, 2002 letter from Gerald G. Ide to Five 
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Star Marketing, 1113 Edgefield Drive, Piano, Texas 75075 regarding termination of 
contract. 
5. Complainant's Exhibit No. 5, consisting of two (2) type written or printed pages, 
being a copy of an UNDATED, UNSIGNED application-enrollment of one Karen K. 
Wilbert as regards Privilege Care. Second page indicates a hand-written receipt for 
$424.00 to the said Karen K. Wilbert from one Jerry Ide. 
6. Complainant's Exhibit No. 6, consisting of two (2) type written or printed pages, 
being a copy of an UNDATED, UNSIGNED application-enrollment of one Kirk C. 
Miller as regards Privilege Care. Second page is a blank copy of a Privilege Care Inc. 
PEO Contractual Agreement. 
7. Complainant's Exhibit No. 7, consisting of one (1) type written or printed page, 
being a copy of an UNDATED, UNSIGNED letter from one Doug Milne to a Mr. Taylor 
regarding Jerry Ide and a "new program that replaced ERISA". Top of letter shows a Fax 
date of February 4, 2002. 
8. Complainant's Exhibit No. 8, consisting of seventeen (17) type written or printed 
pages, being a copy of a 1992 U. S. Department of Labor, Pension and Welfare benefits 
Administration publication entitled: "MEWAs Multiple Employer Welfare Arrangements 
Under the Employee Retirement and Income Security Act: A Guide to Federal and State 
Regulation". 
9. Complainant's Exhibit No. 9, consisting of fifteen (15) type written or printed 
pages, being a copy of a March 24, 1990 National Association of Insurance 
Commissioners publication entitled: "ERISA" by John Keene, U. S. Department of Labor, 
Pension and Welfare Benefits Administration. 
10. Complainant's Exhibit No. 10, consisting of sixteen (16) type written or printed 
pages, being a copies of four (4) separate newsletters of the Utah Department of 
Insurance, each containing four (4) pages, being the respective January 1990, January 
1992, Winter 1993/94 and Summer 1994 issues. Each issue containing an article 
concerning ERISA and or unauthorized insurers, amongst other articles. 
(No objection being made all of which Complainant's exhibits were accepted and 
entered, except for Complainant's Exhibit No. 2 which was not formally offered by the 
Complainant.) 
The Respondent offered the following exhibits: 
1. Respondent's Exhibit No. 1, consisting of one (1) page of typed and or printed 
materials, being a copy of an (UNSIGNED) January 9, 2002 letter from as testified to by 
Gerald G. Ide, Respondent, from Five Star Marketing to Consultants & Managers, 
regarding Employers Mutual plan and "New Companies to Market". 
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2. Respondent's Exhibit No. 2, consisting of one (1) page of typed and or printed 
materials, being a copy of an (UNSIGNED) March 25,2002 letter as testified to by 
Gerald G. Ide, Respondent, from Privilege Care to "whom it may concern", regarding 
Gerald G. Ide and his relationship with Privilege Care. 
3. Respondent's Exhibit No. 3, consisting of one (1) page of typed and or printed 
materials, being a copy of a February 24, 2002 affidavit-letter from Don R. Smith,Five 
Star Marketing, 1113 Edgefield Drive, Piano, Texas 75075 to "Whom it may concern" 
regarding Gerald G. Ide and his relationship with Five Star Marketing. 
4. Respondent's Exhibit No. 4, consisting of one (1) page of typed and or printed 
materials, being a copy of a February 22, 2002 letter from James M. Doyle, President, 
Privilege Care Marketing Group, P. O. Box 177, Moorestown, New Jersey 08057 to 
"whom it may concern" regarding Gerald Ide and his relationship with Privilege Care 
Marketing Group. 
5. Respondent's Exhibit No. 5, consisting of two (2) pages of typed and or printed 
materials, being a copy of a January 22, 2002 Fax from Darene (NO LAST NAME), Five 
Star Marketing, 1113 Edgefield Drive, Piano, Texas 75075 to Nathan Clark regarding 
Privilege Care New Business Procedures effective 02-01-02. 
6. Respondent's Exhibit No. 6, consisting of twenty-two (22) pages of typed and or 
printed materials, being copies of twenty-two (22) separate individuals with various dates 
being "letters of support and character" as regards Gerald G. Ide. 
(No objection being made which exhibits were accepted and entered, except for 
Respondent's Exhibit No. 2 which was accepted and entered over objection of the 
Complainant, and Respondent's Exhibit No. 5 which was withdrawn by the Respondent.) 
Argument followed. 
The Presiding Officer being fully advised in the premises and taking administrative 
notice of the files and records of the Department, now enters his Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, and Order, on behalf of the Department: 
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FINDINGS OF FACT 
I, find by a preponderance of the evidence, the following facts: 
Preliminary-Procedural Facts 
(Paragraphs 1-11) 
1. The Utah Insurance Department ("Department") is a governmental entity of the 
State of Utah. The Department as per Utah Code Ann. Section 31A-2-101 is empowered 
to administer the Insurance Code, Title 31 A, Utah Code Ann., 1953, as amended. 
2. The Respondent, GERALD G. IDE, is: 
a. a licensed insurance agent having obtained and maintained present License No. 
51030 since on or about December 29, 1983, currently suspended as per Emergency 
Proceeding Suspension of License Order under date of February 6* , 2002; and 
b. presently maintains a principal business address of 111 East 5600 South, Suite 
208, Murray, Utah 84107. 
3. a. The Commissioner of the Utah Insurance Department issued his Cease and Desist 
Order under date of December 6th, 2001 directed to the Respondent amongst others in 
regards to the assisting of an unauthorized insurance business, namely Employers Mutual, 
LLC as allegedly exempt from the laws of the State of Utah as per the federal Employers 
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 and allegedly marketed by Five Star Marketing, 
in the State of Utah, in violation of Section 31A-15-102, U. C. A., 1953, as amended; and 
b. The Commissioner of the Utah Insurance Department issued his Cease and Desist 
Order under date of December 6th, 2001 directed to the Respondent amongst others in to 
"immediately Cease and Desist any assistance to any person doing an unauthorized 
insurance business in the State of Utah, including soliciting, marketing, or proposing to 
make an insurance contract, taking receiving or forwarding an application for insurance, 
collecting or receiving, in full or in part, any insurance premium, issuing or delivering an 
insurance policy or other evidence of an insurance contract, publishing or disseminating 
any advertisement or information for insurance, for any unauthorized insurer." 
(Paragraph 2, Page 6, December 6th, 2002 Cease and Desist Order, Docket 2001-242-
HL). (EMPHASIS ADDED). 
4. The Department on or about February 6th, 2002 filed its Complaint alleging those 
violations as set forth in Paragraph 1 of Issue, Burden and Standard of Proof above, and 
issued a Notice of Formal Proceeding Adjudicative Proceeding and Pre-Hearing 
Conference, being Docket No. 2002-007-HL, to the Respondent. A copy of said Notice 
being mailed to the Respondent at his referenced business address on or about February 
6th, 2002. 
5. The Respondent filed his Answer on March 6th, 2002. 
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6. The Complainant filed its Motion for Summary Judgment on March 7 , 2002. 
7. A Pre-Hearing Conference was scheduled for March 13th, 2002 at 10:00 A. M.. 
8. As per a March 13th, 2002 Notice of Continuance of Hearing the March 13th, 2002 
Pre-Hearing Conference was continued to March 20th, 2002 at 10:00 A. M.. 
9. The Respondent filed his Motion for Leave to Amend Answer and tendered his 
proposed Amended Answer on March 19th, 2002. 
10. a. A Pre-Hearing Conference was held on March 20th, 2002 at 10:00 A. M. and a 
Pre-Hearing Conference Order issued on March 20th, 2002 setting said matter for 
hearing on April 24th, 2002 at 9:00 o'clock A. M.; 
b. The Complainant's Motion for Summary Judgment was denied at said Pre-
Hearing Conference. 
b. The Respondent with leave of the Court filed his Amended Answer at said Pre-
Hearing Conference on March 20th, 2002. 
11. That based on the preliminary facts as set forth in paragraphs 1 through 10, 
immediately above, a hearing was held on April 24th, 2002 at 9:00 o'clock A. M.. 
Operative Facts 
(Paragraphs 12-20) 
12. The Department on or about December 6th, 2001 issued a Cease and Desist Order, 
being Docket No. 2001-242-HL, ordering the Respondent, along with others, to 
"immediately cease and desist any assistance to any person doing an unauthorized 
insurance business in the State of Utah, including soliciting, marketing, or proposing to 
make an insurance contract... publishing or disseminating any advertisement or 
information for insurance, for any unauthorized insurern. (EMPHASIS ADDED). 
13. a.i. Included as a Co-Respondent, amongst twenty-seven (27) total Respondents, in 
such December 6th, 2001 Cease and Desist Order was an entity located in the State of 
Texas known as Five Star Marketing, 1113 Edgefield Drive, Piano, Texas 75075 which 
was promoting and marketing unauthorized insurance, namely Employers Mutual, LLC, 
through agents in various states, including the present Respondent in the State of Utah; 
and 
ii. Included as a Co-Respondent, amongst twenty-seven (27) total Respondents, in 
such December 6th, 2001 Cease and Desist Order was one Don R. Smith, 1113 Edgefield 
Drive, Piano, Texas 75075, an officer and or employee of said Five Star Marketing; and 
b.i. Included as a Co-Respondent, amongst twenty-seven (27) total Respondents, in 
such December 6th, 2001 Cease and Desist Order was an entity located in the State of 
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New Jersey known as American Benefit Society, 141 Ganttown Road, Suite E, 
Turnersville, New Jersey 08012 which was operating as a third party administrator for 
said Employers Mutual, LLC; and 
ii. Included as a Co-Respondent, amongst twenty-seven (27) total Respondents, in 
such December 6th, 2001 Cease and Desist Order was one Jim Doyle, 141 Ganttown 
Road, Suite E, Turnersville, New Jersey 08012, an officer and or employee of said 
American Benefit Society. 
14. Since the issuance of such December 6th, 2001 Cease and Desist Order, Respondent 
has continued to assist Five Star Marketing and or others, including one Don R. Smith, 
and one Jim Doyle, both named in said December 6th, 2001 Cease and Desist Order, in 
promoting and soliciting the sale of another unauthorized insurance, namely Privilege 
Care, in the State of Utah, in violation of the December 6th, 2001 Cease and Desist Order. 
15. On or about January 8th, 2002, Respondent contacted a resident of the State of Utah, 
one Karen Wilbert, Santaquin, Utah and solicited health care insurance known as 
Privilege Care, which Respondent claimed was underwritten by Union LxiborLife 
Insurance Company. On or about January 10th, 2002, Respondent took an application 
from such person and collected premium in the amount of $424.00. 
16. The Respondent was advised in person by representatives of the Department on or 
about January 24th, 2002, that the Privilege Care program was not underwritten by the 
Union Labor Life Insurance Company, and that Five Star Marketing was not to do any 
business in the State of Utah, and that Privilege Care was an unauthorized insurer. 
17. On or about January 25th, 2002, Respondent contacted another resident of the State 
of Utah, one Kirk C. Miller, Centerville, Utah and solicited health care insurance through 
Privilege Care. 
18. On or about January 29th, 2002, Respondent contacted a licensed agent, Doug 
Milne, in the State of Utah, and provided such agent information and application forms to 
deliver to a Mr. Milne's client, a resident of the State of Utah, to enroll such person in 
Privilege Care in place of a previously written Employers Mutual, LLC policy. 
19. Privilege Care is being promoted by Five Star Marketing and Privilege Care 
Marketing Group, Inc., which claims that it is/was underwritten by the Union Labor Life 
Insurance Company. The Union Labor Life Insurance Company has denied that it is/was 
underwriting any program known as Privilege Care and denies any knowledge of such 
program. 
20. Privilege Care is/was not authorized to be in the insurance business in the State of 
Utah. 
Q 
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DISCUSSION-ANALYSIS 
(Paragraphs 1 - 2 1 ) 
1. a. Both the Respondent and the Department in large measure while advocating 
clearly different characterizations or interpretations of the above referenced operative 
facts in substance concurred as to the basic chronology and core facts. 
b. The record now being complete sets forth competent and credible evidence for 
the entry of the following analysis. 
2. The question(s) presented is: 
a. "Whether the Respondent's actions are violative the Commissioner's December 
6th, 2001 Cease and Desist Order and or of Utah Code Ann. Section 31A-15-102?"; and 
b. "If the Respondent has so violated both or either of said Commissioner's 
December 6th, 2001 Cease and Desist Order or said cited statutory section what, if any, is 
the appropriate penalty to be imposed"; and 
c. Whether as per Utah Administrative Code Rule, R590-160-5 J as to each of the 
above and foregoing "issue(s)" or "question(s)" to be answered the "standard of proof' 
as to issues of fact have been proven by a "preponderance of the evidence"? 
3. Applicable Pertinent Statutes and Administrative Rules are as follows (although 
others may be otherwise specifically cited within the body of this "Order on Hearing"): 
a. i. Section 31A-1-104 states: 
31A-1-104. Authorization to do insurance business. 
A person may not engage in the following without complying with this title: 
(1) do an insurance business as defined under Section 31 A-1-301; 
(2) act as an insurance agent, broker, or consultant as defined under Section 31A-1-
301; or 
(3) engage in insurance adjusting as defined under Section 31A-26-102. 
ii. Subsection 31A-1-301(64) states: 
31A-1-301. Definitions. 
"As used in this title, unless otherwise specified: 
(64) "Insurance business" or "business of insurance" includes: 
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(a) providing health care insurance, as defined in Subsection (51), by organizations 
that are or should be licensed under this title; 
(b) providing benefits to employees in the event of contingencies not within the 
control of the employees, in which the employees are entitled to the benefits as a right, 
which benefits may be provided either: 
(i) by single employers or by multiple employer groups; or 
(ii) through trusts, associations, or other entities; 
(c) providing annuities, including those issued in return for gifts, except those 
provided by persons specified in Subsections 31A-22-1305(2) and (3); 
(d) providing the characteristic services of motor clubs as outlined in Subsection 
(77); 
(e) providing other persons with insurance as defined in Subsection (59); 
(f) making as insurer, guarantor, or surety, or proposing to make as insurer, 
guarantor, or surety, any contract or policy of title insurance; 
(g) transacting or proposing to transact any phase of title insurance, including 
solicitation, negotiation preliminary to execution, execution of a contract of title 
insurance, insuring, and transacting matters subsequent to the execution of the contract 
and arising out of it, including reinsurance; and 
(h) doing, or proposing to do, any business in substance equivalent to Subsections 
(64)(a) through (g) in a manner designed to evade the provisions of this title. 
b. i. Section 31A-1-105 states: 
31A-1-105. Presumption of jurisdiction. 
(1) Any insurer, including the Workers' Compensation Fund created under Chapter 
33, that provides coverage of a resident of this state, property located in this state, or a 
business activity conducted in this state, or that engages in any activity described in 
Subsections 31A-15-102(2)(a) through (h), is: 
(a) doing an insurance business in this state; and 
(b) subject to the jurisdiction of the insurance commissioner and the courts of this 
state under Sections 31A-2-309 and 31A-2-310 to the extent of that coverage or activity. 
(2) Any person doing or purporting to do an insurance business in this state as 
defined in Section 31A-1-301 is subject to the jurisdiction of the insurance commissioner 
and this title, unless the insurer can establish that the exemptions of Section 31A-1-103 
apply. 
(3) This section does not limit the jurisdiction of the courts of this state under other 
applicable law. 
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(EMPHASIS ADDED). 
ii. Subsection 31A-l-103(3)(a) states: 
31A-1-103. Scope and applicability of title. 
"(3) Except as otherwise expressly provided, this title does not apply to: 
(a) those activities of an insurer where state jurisdiction is preempted by 
Section 514 of the federal Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, as 
amended;" 
c. Subsection 31A-2-201(4)(a) states: 
31A-2-201. General duties and powers. 
"(4)(a) The commissioner shall issue prohibitory, mandatory, and other orders 
necessary to secure compliance with this title. An order by the commissioner is not 
effective unless the order: 
(i) is in writing; and 
(ii) is signed by the commissioner or under the commissioner's authority." 
d. Subsection 31A-2-308(l)(a) and (b) states: 
31A-2-308. Enforcement penalties and procedures. 
"(1) (a) A person who violates any insurance statute or rule or any order issued under 
Subsection 31A-2-201(4) shall forfeit to the state twice the amount of any profit gained 
from the violation, in addition to any other forfeiture or penalty imposed. 
(b) (i) The commissioner may order an individual agent, broker, adjuster, or insurance 
consultant who violates an insurance statute or rule to forfeit to the state not more than 
$2,500 for each violation. 
(ii) The commissioner may order any other person who violates an insurance statute 
or rule to forfeit to the state not more than $5,000 for each violation." 
(EMPHASIS ADDED). 
e. Subsection 31A-2-308(10) states: 
31A-2-308. Enforcement penalties and procedures. 
"(10) (a) After a hearing, the commissioner may, in whole or in part, revoke, 
suspend, place on probation, limit, or refuse to renew the licensee's license or certificate 
of authority: 
(i) when a licensee of the department, other than a domestic insurer: 
(A) persistently or substantially violates the insurance law; or 
11 
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(B) violates an order of the commissioner under Subsection 31A-2-201(4); 
(ii) if there are grounds for delinquency proceedings against the licensee under 
Section 31A-27-301 or Section 31A-27-307; or 
(iii) if the licensee's methods and practices in the conduct of the licensee's business 
endanger, or the licensee's financial resources are inadequate to safeguard, the legitimate 
interests of the licensee's customers and the public. 
(b) Additional license termination or probation provisions for licensees other than 
insurers are set forth in Sections 31A-19a-303, 31A-19a-304, 31A-23-216, 31A-23-217, 
31A-25-208, 31A-25-209, 31A-26-213, 31A-26-214, 31A-35-501, and 31A-35-503." 
(EMPHASIS ADDED). 
f. Section 31A-4-106 states: 
31A-4-106. Provision of health care. 
(1) As used in this section, "health care provider" has the same definition as in 
Section 78-14-3. 
(2) Except under Subsection (3) or (4), a person may not directly or indirectly 
provide health care, or arrange for, manage, or administer the provision or arrangement 
of, collect advance payments for, or compensate providers of health care unless 
authorized to do so or employed by someone authorized to do so under Chapter 5, 7, 8, 9, 
or 14. 
(3) Subsection (2) does not apply to: 
(a) a natural person or professional corporation that alone or with others 
professionally associated with the natural person or professional corporation, and without 
receiving consideration for services in advance of the need for a particular service, 
provides the service personally with the aid of nonprofessional assistants; 
(b) a health care facility as defined in Section 26-21-2 which: 
(i) is licensed or exempt from licensing under Title 26, Chapter 21; and 
(ii) does not engage in health care insurance as defined under Section 31 A-1-301; 
(c) a person who files with the commissioner under Section 31A-1-105 a 
certificate from the United States Department of Labor, or other evidence 
satisfactory to the commissioner, showing that the laws of Utah are preempted 
under Section 514 of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 or other 
federal law; 
(d) a person licensed under Chapter 23 who: 
(i) has arranged for the insurance of all services under: 
(A) Subsection (2) by an insurer authorized to do business m Utah; 
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(B) Section 31A-15-103; or 
(C) works for an uninsured employer that complies with Chapter 13; or 
(e) an employer that self-funds its obligations to provide health care services or 
indemnity for its employees if the employer complies with Chapter 13. 
(4) A person may not provide administrative or management services for any other 
person subject to Subsection (2) and not exempt under Subsection (3) unless the person is 
an authorized insurer under Chapter 5, 7, 8, 9, or 14, or complies with Chapter 25. 
(5) It is unlawful for any insurer or person providing, administering, or managing 
health care insurance under Chapter 5, 7, 8, 9, or 14 to enter into a contract that limits a 
health care provider's ability to advise the health care provider's patients or clients fully 
about treatment options or other issues that affect the health care of the health care 
provider's patients or clients. 
(EMPHASIS ADDED). 
g. Section 31A-15-102 states: 
31A-15-102. Assisting unauthorized insurers. 
(1) No person may do any act enumerated under Subsection (2) who knows or should 
know that the act may assist in the illegal placement of insurance with an unauthorized 
insurer or the subsequent servicing of an insurance policy illegally placed with an 
unauthorized insurer. 
(2) An act performed by mail is performed both at the place of mailing and at the 
place of delivery. Any of the following acts, whether performed by mail or otherwise, fall 
within the prohibition of Subsection (1): 
(a) soliciting, making, or proposing to make an insurance contract; 
(b) taking, receiving, or forwarding an application for insurance; 
(c) collecting or receiving, in full or in part, an insurance premium; 
(d) issuing or delivering an insurance policy or other evidence of an insurance 
contract except as a messenger not employed by the insurer, an insurance agent, or a 
broker; 
(e) doing any of the following in connection with the solicitation, negotiation, 
procuring, or effectuation of insurance coverage for another: inspecting risks, setting 
rates, advertising, disseminating information, or advising on risk management; 
(f) publishing or disseminating any advertisement encouraging the placement or 
servicing of insurance that would violate Subsection (1); however this provision does not 
apply to publication or dissemination to an audience primarily outside Utah that also 
reaches persons in Utah unless the extension to persons inside Utah can be conveniently 
avoided without substantial expense other than loss of revenue; nor does it apply to 
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regional or national network programs on radio or television unless they originate in 
Utah; 
(g) investigating, settling, adjusting, or litigating claims; or 
(h) representing or assisting any person to do an unauthorized insurance business or 
to procure insurance from an unauthorized insurer. 
(3) Subsection (1) does not prohibit: 
(a) an attorney acting for a client; 
(b) a full-time salaried employee of an insured acting in the capacity of an insurance 
buyer or manager; or 
(c) insurance activities described under Section 31A-15-103. 
(4) Any act performed in Utah which is prohibited under this section constitutes 
appointment of the commissioner or the lieutenant governor as agent for service of 
process under Sections 31A-2-309 and 31A-2-310. 
(EMPHASIS ADDED). 
h. Section 31A-23-216 states in part: 
31A-23-216. Termination of license. 
"(1) A license issued under this chapter remains in force until: 
(a) revoked, suspended, or limited under Subsection (2); 
(b) lapsed under Subsection (3); 
(c) surrendered to and accepted by the commissioner; or 
(d) the licensee dies or is adjudicated incompetent as defined under Title 75, Chapter 
5, Part 3, Guardians of Incapacitated Persons or Part 4, Protection of Property of Persons 
Under Disability and Minors. 
(2) (a) If the commissioner makes a finding under Subsection (2)(b), after an 
adjudicative proceeding under Title 63, Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures Act, the 
commissioner may: 
(i) revoke a license of an agent, broker, surplus lines broker, or consultant; 
(ii) suspend for a specified period of 12 months or less a license of an agent, broker, 
surplus lines broker, or consultant; or 
(iii) limit in whole or in part the license of any agent, broker, surplus lines broker, or 
consultant. 
(b) The commissioner may take an action described in Subsection (2)(a) if the 
commissioner finds that the licensee: 
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(i) is unqualified for a license under Section 31A-23-203; 
(ii) has violated: 
(A) an insurance statute; 
(B) a rule that is valid under Subsection 31 A-2-201(3); or 
(C) an order that is valid under Subsection 31A-2-201(4);" 
i. Section 31A-23-405 states: 
31A-23-405. Services performed for unauthorized insurers. 
(1) A person licensed under Chapter 23 may not perform any act that assists any 
person not authorized as an insurer to act as an insurer. 
(2) It is a violation of this section to assist any person purporting to be exempt 
from state insurance regulation under Section 514 of the Employee Retirement 
Income Security Act of 1974, unless that person has rebutted the presumption of 
jurisdiction under Section 31A-1-105. 
(3) It is not a violation of this section: 
(a) to assist persons engaged in self insurance as defined under Section 31A-1-301; or 
(b) for a surplus lines broker to engage in the placement of insurance under Section 
31A-15-103. 
(EMPHASIS ADDED). 
j . Section 514 of the federal Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 reads in 
part: 
29 U. S. C. 1144. - Other laws (ERISA sec. 514) 
(a) Supersedure; effective date. Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, 
the provisions of this subchapter and subchapter III of this chapter shall supersede any 
and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit 
plan described in section 1003(a) of this title and not exempt under section 1003(b) of 
this title. This section shall take effect on January 1,1975. 
(b) Construction and application. 
(1) This section shall not apply with respect to any cause of action which arose, or 
any act or omission which occurred, before January 1,1975. 
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(2) (A) Except as provided in subparagraph (B), nothing in this subchapter shall be 
construed to exempt or relieve any person from any law of any State which regulates 
insurance, banking, or securities. 
(B) Neither an employee benefit plan described in section 1003(a) of this title, 
which is not exempt under section 1003(b) of this title (other than a plan established 
primarily for the purpose of providing death benefits), nor any trust established under 
such a plan, shall be deemed to be an insurance company or other insurer, bank, trust 
company, or investment company or to be engaged in the business of insurance or 
banking for purposes of any law of any State purporting to regulate insurance companies, 
insurance contracts, banks, trust companies, or investment companies. 
(3) Nothing in this section shall be construed to prohibit use by the Secretary of 
services or facilities of a State agency as permitted under section 1136 of this title. 
(4) Subsection (a) of this section shall not apply to any generally applicable criminal 
law of a State. 
(5) (A) Except as provided in subparagraph (B), subsection (a) of this section shall 




(6)(A) Notwithstanding any other provision of this section -
(i) in the case of an employee welfare benefit plan which is a multiple 
employer welfare arrangement and is fully insured (or which is a multiple employer 
welfare arrangement subject to an exemption under subparagraph (B)), any law of any 
State which regulates insurance may apply to such arrangement to the extent that such 
law provides -
(I) standards, requiring the maintenance of specified levels of reserves and 
specified levels of contributions, which any such plan, or any trust established under such 
a plan, must meet in order to be considered under such law able to pay benefits in full 
when due, and 
(II) provisions to enforce such standards, and 
(ii) in the case of any other employee welfare benefit plan which is a multiple 
employer welfare arrangement, in addition to this subchapter, any law of any State which 
regulates insurance may apply to the extent not inconsistent with the preceding sections 
of this subchapter. 
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(B) The Secretary may, under regulations which may be prescribed by the 
Secretary, exempt from subparagraph (A)(ii), individually or by class, multiple employer 
welfare arrangements which are not fully insured. Any such exemption may be granted 
with respect to any arrangement or class of arrangements only if such arrangement or 
each arrangement which is a member of such class meets the requirements of section 
1002(1) and section 1003 of this title necessary to be considered an employee welfare 
benefit plan to which this subchapter applies. 
(C) Nothing in subparagraph (A) shall affect the manner or extent to which the 
provisions of this subchapter apply to an employee welfare benefit plan which is not a 
multiple employer welfare arrangement and which is a plan, fund, or program 
participating in, subscribing to, or otherwise using a multiple employer welfare 
arrangement to fund or administer benefits to such plan's participants and beneficiaries. 
(D) For purposes of this paragraph, a multiple employer welfare arrangement shall be 
considered fully insured only if the terms of the arrangement provide for benefits the 
amount of all of which the Secretary determines are guaranteed under a contract, or 
policy of insurance, issued by an insurance company, insurance service, or insurance 
organization, qualified to conduct business in a State. 
(7) Subsection (a) of this section shall not apply to qualified domestic relations 
orders , qualified medical child support orders to the extent they apply to 
qualified medical child support orders. 
(8) Subsection (a) of this section shall not be construed to preclude any State cause 
of action -
(A) with respect to which the State exercises its acquired rights under section 
1169(b)(3) of this title with respect to a group health plan (as defined in section 1167(1) 
of this title), or 
(B) for recoupment of payment with respect to items or services pursuant to a 
State plan for medical assistance approved under title XIX of the Social Security Act. . . 
(9) For additional provisions relating to group health plans, see section 1191 of this 
title. 
(c) Definitions. For purposes of this section: 
(1) The term "State law" includes all laws, decisions, rules, regulations, or other 
State action having the effect of law, of any State. A law of the United States applicable 
only to the District of Columbia shall be treated as a State law rather than a law of the 
United States. 
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(2) The term "State" includes a State, any political subdivisions thereof, or any 
agency or instrumentality of either, which purports to regulate, directly or indirectly, the 
terms and conditions of employee benefit plans covered by this subchapter. 
(d) Alteration, amendment, modification, invalidation, impairment, or 
supersedure of any law of the United States prohibited. Nothing in this subchapter 
shall be construed to alter, amend, modify, invalidate, impair, or supersede any law of the 
United States (except as provided in sections 1031 and 1137(c) of this title) or any rule or 
regulation issued under any such law. 
(EMPHASIS ADDED). 
4. a. i. Without extensive elaboration of the Respondent's actions which the Court will 
dispense with such can be said to be clearly in assistance to one doing an insurance-like 
business) 
ii. Whether application forms were or were not handed-in or whether money was 
collected and was or was not handed-in or whether policies were or were not delivered is 
in so many words irrelevant. 
iii. The activities referenced in Subsection 31A-15-102(2)(a) through (h) are 
fairly encompassing. One could venture to say that the Respondent in one form or 
another took part to a greater or lesser extent in all of such. 
b.i. The heart or determinative issue is whether or not both of or either of the two 
(2) companies the Respondent represented and solicited on behalf of and thus assisted 
were or were not exempt form the jurisdiction of the Utah Insurance Code. 
ii. (A) If within the jurisdiction of the Code such companies should be registered 
with the Department and absent such registration such companies are doing an 
unauthorized insurance business and the Respondent's assistance thereof would be in 
violation of the December 6th, 2001 Cease and Desist Order as well as Section 31A-15-
102, U. C. A., 1953, as amended; or 
(B) If exempt from the coverage of the Code such companies need not be 
registered and whatever the Respondent's assistance thereof such would not be in 
violation of the December 6th, 2001 Cease and Desist Order as well as Section 31 A-15-
102, U. C. A., 1953, as amended. 
1
 It is clear from the testimony of Ms. Wilbert and Mr. Miller they thought that the Respondent was selling 
and that they were buying health care insurance. 
2
 Absent Subsection 31A-15-102(2)(d) "issuing or delivering an insurance policy,, which is one of the 
problems with the Respondent and the companies he represented — policies and coverage were promised, 
but were never delivered and coverage never extended. Suffice it to say the Respondent "assisted" and 
advanced both of the named entities' interests by Respondent's actions irrespective if money did or did not 
change hands from Ms. Wilbert and or Mr. Miller and or Mr. Milne's unnamed client to either of the 
named "insurers". SEE "Findings of Fact" No.s 15,17 and 18, above. 
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5. a. Section 31A-1-105 creates a "presumption of jurisdiction' "unless the insurer can 
establish that the exemptions of Section 31 A-1-103 apply. 
b. The one relevant possible exemption in Section 31A-1-103 is found in Subsection 
31A-l-103(3)(a) wherein it states: "(3) Except as otherwise expressly provided this title 
does not apply to: (a) those activities of an insurer where state jurisdiction is preempted 
by Section 514 of the federal Employee Income Security Act of 1974, as amended", 
commonly called "ERISA". 
c. i. Section 31A-4-106(3) establishes a mechanism whereby a purported ERISA 
entity providing "health care benefits" may "rebut" such presumption of jurisdiction and 
prove its exemption status. 
ii. "[A] person (or entity) person who files with the commissioner under 
Section 31A-1-105 a certificate from the United States Department of Labor, or 
other evidence satisfactory to the commissioner, showing that the laws of Utah are 
preempted under Section 514 of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 
1974 or other federal law" is exempted. 
6. While there was testimony from Mr. Garnett to the effect "that Privilege Care PEO 
has everything in order with [LJabor" the record is devoid of any certificate from the 
United States Department of Labor regarding either Employers Mutual, LLC and or 
Privilege Care PEO. 
7. Such lack of a certificate from the United States Department of Labor leads the 
Court to review and weigh as per Subsection 31A-4-106(3) what "other evidence", if any, 
"satisfactory to the commissioner' is in the record "showing that the laws of Utah are 
preempted". 
8. a. Respondent through counsel argued that both Employers Mutual, LLC and 
Privilege Care PEO are "employee leasing companies" or "professional employer 
organizations" ("PEO") offering and administering "ERISA" sanctioned health benefits 
programs to small employer groups. SEE Chapter 59 of Title 58, "Professional Employer 
Organization Licensing Act". 
b. It would appear that PEOs can qualify as ERISA sanctioned entities. 
9. While counsel for the Respondent argued that Employers Mutual, LLC was a PEO 
and an ERISA program there is no definitive nor conclusive testimonial or documentary 
evidence in the record in the Court's mind to sustain such. Accordingly the Court finds 
that Employers Mutual, LLC is not a PEO offering an ERISA sanctioned program or 
otherwise. 
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lO.a. As to Privilege Care PEO there was testimony from Mr. Garnett and "self-
proving" documentary exhibits that Privilege Care PEO is a "professional employer 
organization. 
b.i. Privilege Care PEO though is not registered with the Utah Department of 
Commerce which has specific jurisdiction over PEOs. 
ii. As advanced by counsel for the Respondent and per Mr. Garnett's testimony as 
per Section 58-59-305(2) "a professional employer organization, which is not domiciled 
in this state, and which employs less than 25 employees working within this state" is 
exempt from licensure under Chapter 59 of Title 58. Privilege Care PEO is not domiciled 
in Utah nor does it have 25 or more employees working within this state. 
iii. Privilege Care PEO need not be licensed as a PEO. 
11. While Respondent's and Privilege Care PEO's evidentiary proof can be said to be 
"self-proving or "self-serving" arguendo assuming Privilege Care PEO is a PEO is the 
health benefits program it offers to "employers" amongst other PEO benefits such as to 
be ERISA sanctioned and pre-empted from the laws of the State of Utah and the 
jurisdiction of the Utah Insurance Department? 
12. a. As per Paragraph 6, above, "[WJhile there was testimony from Mr. Garnett to the 
effect "that Privilege Care PEO has everything in order with [L]abor" the record is again 
devoid of any certificate from the United States Department of Labor regarding 
Privilege Care PEO" or anything other than such statement in the record. 
b. The testimony of Mr. Garnett and the advanced documentary evidence as to 
Privilege Care PEO being an ERISA sanctioned benefits program is "self-proving" and 
"self-serving". 
c. No literature other than some token letters lacking even a letterhead in some 
instances was presented. No articles of incorporation nor the arguably determinative 
"agreement" with the labor union repeatedly spoken of by Mr. Garnett were presented. 
13. The "burden" of proving such exemption to the satisfaction of the Commissioner is 
on the entity tendering such. Here Privilege Care PEO itself has not made an "application 
for exemption", but such has been advanced by the Respondent as a defense. The burden 
accordingly in such circumstance is on the Respondent. The Respondent has failed to 
prove such exemption. 
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14. The Respondent has violated the December 6 , 2001 Cease and Desist Order and 
Utah Code Ann. Section 31 A-15-102 based on Respondent's assistance to Privilege Care 
PEO doing an unauthorized insurance business in the State of Utah.3 
15. The Court having determined that neither Employers Mutual, LLC nor Privilege 
Care PEO for purposes of the present proceeding are ERISA sanctioned programs and 
that as such the Respondent's actions in marketing such were in violation as alleged by 
the Complainant the question now becomes what is the appropriate penalty? 
16. a. No evidence of previous similar violations or other major problems with the 
Respondent's license were presented. 
b. i.As per Respondent's Exhibit No. 6 at least twenty-two (22) separate persons 
have advanced letters of support for the Respondent. Some apparently being former or 
present co-workers or agents as well as consumers for whom the Respondent has served 
as an agent. 
ii. Such letters speak glowingly of the Respondent as a person. And the Court in 
viewing the Respondent's testimony does not doubt that he is basically a sincere and 
good person. 
17. a. That said the evidence is also abundantly clear that the Respondent was not a 
good agent and has done a great disservice to the particular consumers to whom he 
marketed in the present instance. 
b. i. It is clear that the Respondent was for want of a better phrase uout of his 
element". 
ii. The Respondent had no idea what ERISA was and even at the hearing the 
Court questions if the Respondent even now has any real idea of what an ERISA program 
is. 
c. To market any product on the say so of non-letterhead marketing "rah-rah" as 
presented by Five Star Marketing as to Employers Mutual, LL in the first place raises 
serious questions in the Court's mind. 
Counsel for Respondent makes much ado that Privilege Care PEO\s program and actions are not 
insurance. Ms. Wilbert's and Mr. Millers testimony clearly indicated that they believed it was insurance. 
From the Court's review of Complainant Exhibit No. 3, which is the only real printed literature about the 
companies advanced, consisting of sixteen (16) pages while there is present the "contractual agreement" 
spoken of by Mr. Garnett and some other references to "multiemployer trusts" (ERISA language, etc.) the 
bulk of the apparent Privilege Care PEO/Privilege Care Marketing Group , Inc. information presents itself 
as health insurance marketing materials. The average person looking at such (especially the "self-
employed' targets) like Ms. Wilbert and Mr. Miller as they testified would as does the Court view such as 
"health care insurance". Calling a horse a cow does not make it moo. Just simply calling health care 
insurance an ERISA sanctioned program does not make it so. Neigh (sic) this is/was insurance which the 
marketers hoped to ride on the backs of consumers to the finish line of the consumers pocketbook. While 
the Respondent may not have been the trainer or jockey he was one of the stable exercise boys assisting in 
preparing for the race. 
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d. i. To then even after the issuance of the December 6 , 2001 Cease and Desist 
Order wherein it clearly stated that Respondent "shall immediately Cease and Desist any 
assistance to any person doing an unauthorized insurance business in the State of Utah" 
to market Privilege Care PEO or any other product on the mere further non-letterheaded 
printed material say so or verbal thoughts of one (James M. Doyle) who states "we're not 
named in the C & D so go ahead" or words to such effect borders on incredulity. 
ii. It is especially disturbing that red flags didn't go up to the Respondent 
when such statement was made by a James M. Doyle, President, Privilege Care 
Marketing Group, Inc., P. O. Box 177, Moorestown, New Jersey 08057, when one of the 
named Respondents in the December 6th, 2001 Cease and Desist was a Jim Doyle, 141 
Ganttown Road, Suite E, Turnersville, New Jersey 08012. Such in itself let alone the 
other issues rampant in the program(s) raised the necessity of extensive "due diligence" 
on the Respondent's part. 
e. The Respondent argues he did due diligence. In so many words the Respondent's 
due diligence was taking on face value what the marketers told him or faxed him. This 
sounds much like the Emperor's New Clothes. For like the "two swindlers [who] came to 
this city; they made people believe that they were weavers and declared they could 
manufacture the finest cloth to be imagined(.)" and that "[t]heir colours and patterns, they 
said, were not only exceptionally beautiful, but the clothes made of their material 
possessed the wonderful quality of being invisible to any man who was unfit for his 
office or unpardonably stupidQ", so too were "weavers" Don R. Smith and Jim Doyle 
strangers to this (Salt Lake) city.4 The Respondent did little if anything to look behind the 
promotional materials and search out what ERISA is/was or inquire of the alleged 
underwriter other than one or two token phone calls. As testified to by Mr. Taylor, 
Department Market Conduct Examiner, "if its sounds too good to be true, " 
18. a. That the Respondent would on January 25th, 2002 after having been told less 
than twenty-four (24) hours prior on January 24th, 2002 by Department representatives 
that Privilege Care PEO was at the least questionable and as testified to by both Mr. 
Hansen and Mr. Taylor told that it was an unauthorized insurer go ahead and market such 
to Mr. Miller surpasses incredulity and approaches ludicrous behavior. 
b. And beyond the January 25th, 2002 Miller circumstance further on January 29th, 
2002 the Respondent approached Mr. Milne, a fellow agent, as to marketing Privilege 
Care. 
c. While arguendo misguided and confused prior to the January 24th, 2002 face to 
face warning from Department representatives the Respondent's actions on January 25th 
and 29th, 2002 raise in the Court's mind questions of not only the Respondent's arguable 
competence as an agent, but whether Respondent is a rationale functioning adult as well. 
4
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19. The Respondent presents that no one was harmed. That he has made whole the 
instant consumers. Such speaks well of the Respondent yet the Court gets the impression 
such was done not so much out of empathy for the consumer and what the Respondent 
did to place the consumer "in harms way", but apprehension of what might befall the 
Respondent. 
20. Counsel for the Complainant has aptly labeled the Respondent's actions in 
assisting in doing of an unauthorized insurance business as the "second greatest sin" that 
an agent could commit. Second only to an agent taking premiums and not delivering 
them to an insurer or of embezzlement of insurance proceeds. Counsel is correct in his 
analysis. 
21. a. The Respondent's testimony at hearing reminds one of the Emperor's actions 
when he heard the little child exclaim amongst others "But he has nothing on at all". For 
as the fable states: "That made a deep impression upon the emperor, for it seemed to him 
that they were right; but he thought to himself 'Now I must bear up to the end\ And the 
chamberlains walked with still greater dignity, as they carried the train which did not 
exist."5 
b. The Court accordingly feels that anything short of revocation of the 
Respondent's license at this time would not serve the interest of the general public nor 
protect the potential consumers the Respondent might come in contact with would he be 
permitted to retain his agent license for like the Emperor he is "unfit for his office". 
BASED ON THE ABOVE AND FOREGOING FINDINGS OF FACT and 
discussion-analysis the Presiding Officer enters the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The [Commissioner's] Cease and Desist Order under date of December 6th, 2001 
was promulgated in accordance with Section 31A-2-201(4) and was an "order[s as] 
necessary to secure compliance with this title (Title 31 A)." 
2. a. The Respondent assisted at least two (2) persons and or entities doing an 
unauthorized insurance business in the State of Utah, namely Employers Mutual, LLC 
and Privilege Care PEO. 
b. The Respondent violated the December 6th, 2001 Cease and Desist Order and 
Utah Code Ann. Section 31A-15-102 based on Respondent's assistance to a person(s) 
doing an unauthorized insurance business in the State of Utah. 
5
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3. The imposition of a $2,500.00 administrative forfeiture in accordance with Section 
31A-2-308(l)(b)(i) is within the statutory authority of the Department to impose for a 
violation as herein proven by the Complainant Department. 
4. The "forfeit(ing) to the state twice the amount of any profit gained from the 
violation, in addition to any other forfeiture or penalty imposed' in accordance with 
Section 31A-2-308(l)(a) is within the statutory authority of the Department to impose for 
a violation as herein proved by the Complainant Department. 
5. The revocation of an agent's license in accordance with Sections 31A-2-308(10) and 
31A-23-216 is within the statutory authority of the Department to impose for a violation 
as herein proven by the Complainant Department. 
AND BASED ON THE ABOVE AND FOREGOING CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
the Presiding Officer enters the following: 
ORDER 
WHEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that: 
1. The Respondent being in violation of the December 6th, 2001 Cease and Desist 
Order and Utah Code Ann. Section 31A-15-102 in accordance with Section 31A-2-
308(1 )(b)(i)is hereby assessed an administrative forfeiture of $2,500.00. 
2. The Respondent being in violation of the December 6th, 2001 Cease and Desist 
Order and Utah Code Ann. Section 31 A-15-102 in accordance with Section 31A-2-
308(1 )(a) "shall forfeit to the state twice the amount of any profit gained from the 
violation'' once such profit, if any, is determined after examination of the Respondent's 
financial records by Department representatives. 
3. The Respondent being in violation of the December 6th, 2001 Cease and Desist 
Order and Utah Code Ann. Section 31A-15-102 in accordance with Sections 31A-2-
308(10) and 31A-23-216 the Respondent's insurance agent license is hereby revoked 
immediately upon entry of this order. 
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DATED and ENTERED this 30th day of April, 2002. 
MERWIN U. STEWART, 
INSURANCE COMMISSIONER 
IK E. KLEINFIELD 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE and 
PRESIDING OFFICER 
Utah Insurance Department 
State Office Building, Room 3110 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Telephone: (801) 537-9246 
Facsimile: (801) 538-3829 
Email: MKleinfield@utah.gov 
# | * *J% 5J> #J^ #J^ #J^ 5|% 5J» # j ^ 
ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY REVIEW 
Administrative Agency Review of this Order may be obtained by filing a Petition for 
Review with the Commissioner of the Utah Insurance Department within thirty (30) days 
of the date of entry of said Order consistent with Utah Code Ann. Section 63-46b-12 and 
Administrative Rule R590-160-8. 
Failure to seek agency review shall be considered a failure to exhaust 
administrative remedies. 
(R590-160-8 and Section 63-46b-14) 
JUDICIAL REVIEW 
As an "Formal Hearing" after agency review judicial review of this Order may be 
obtained by filing a petition for such review consistent with Utah Code Ann. Section 63-
46b-16. 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the &0 day of April, 2002 a true and correct copy of the 
above and foregoing ORDER ON HEARING (Formal Hearing) was sent certified mail, 
return receipt requested, and first class mail, both postage prepaid to the following: 
Gregory J. Sanders 
Kipp & Christian, P. C. 
Attorney for Respondent 
10 Exchange Place, 4th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
and a true and correct copy hand-delivered to the following: 
M. Gale Lemmon 
Enforcement Counsel 
Attorney for Complainant 
Utah Insurance Department 
State Office Building, Room 3110 
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Exhibits are omitted. They may be found 
in the record, pages 128 through 251. 
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ADDENDUM "B' 
Order on Review 
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BEFORE THE INSURANCE COMMISSIONER 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
COMPLAINANT: 
UTAH STATE INSURANCE DEPARTMENT 
RESPONDENT: 
GERALD G. IDE 
License No. 51030 
Gerald G. Ide (also referred to as "Respondent") filed a request for Agency Review 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. (U.C.A.) Section 63-46b-12 and Utah Administrative Code (U.A.C.) 
Rule, R590-160-8. Respondent did not request oral argument 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This case began as an emergency proceeding to suspend the Respondent's license. The 
Utah Insurance Department (also referred to as "Complainant") issued an Emergency Proceeding 
Suspension of License on February 6, 2002. The Order suspended the Respondent's producer's 
license as of February 6, 2002 for a period of 12 months from the date of the order; ordered the 
Respondent to cease doing any insurance business in the State of Utah; and ordered the 
Complainant to commence a formal adjudicative proceeding against the Respondent for the 
revocation of Respondent's license pursuant to the provisions of U.C.A Section 63-46b-l, et seq. 
The Complainant issued a Notice of Formal Adjudicative Proceeding and Pre-Hearing 
Conference on February 6, 2002. A pre-hearing conference was set for March 13, 2002. The 
notice included a copy of the Complaint alleging that the Respondent had engaged in conduct 
that violated an Order of the Commissioner and provisions of the Utah Insurance Code. The 
Complaint demanded that a hearing be set in the matter; that Respondent's license be revoked; 
and such other relief as the presiding officer deems just. 
On March 6, 2002, the Complainant received Respondent's answer to the Complaint 
issued February 6, 2002. In this answer, Respondent requested that his license be reinstated and 
the complaint dismissed. On March 7, 2002, the Complainant made a Motion for Summary 
Judgment to be heard at the Pre-Hearing Conference scheduled for March 13, 2002. The Pre-
Hearing Conference was continued to March 20, 2002. 
ORDER ON REVIEW 
Docket No. 2002-007-HL 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
On March 19,2002, Respondent filed a Memorandum Opposing Motion for Summary 
Judgment and a Motion to Amend Answer. On March 20,2002, following the pre-hearing 
conference, a Pre-Hearing Conference Order was issued granting the Complainant's motion to 
withdraw its Motion for Summary Judgment; granting the Respondent's Motion to Amend 
Answer; setting April 24, 2002 as the date for a formal administrative hearing; setting forth the 
rules for discovery; setting a cut-off date for motions; setting dates for statements of facts and 
statements of issue(s); setting a date for the exchanging of witness lists and exhibit lists; and 
setting a date for filing of pre-hearing memorandum. 
The formal hearing was conducted on April 24,2002. Exhibits, witness testimony, and 
testimony from the Respondent and the Complainant were presented during the hearing. On 
April 30,2002, the presiding officer issued his Order on Hearing. That order assessed an 
administrative forfeiture of $2,500.00, assessed a forfeiture of twice the amount of profit gained 
from the violation, and immediately revoked the Respondent's producer's license. The order 
paperwork also included instructions for seeking administrative agency review and judicial 
review. 
Respondent filed a Petition for Review on May 24, 2002. The Petition requested review 
on the following grounds: (1) the discipline imposed by the Order is disproportionate to the 
offense alleged; and (2) the decision process explained in the Order shifts the burden of proof 
from the Complainant to the Respondent and thereby inappropriately concludes as a matter of 
fact and as a matter of law that Respondent's license should be revoked. Also on May 24,2002, 
Respondent requested that the tapes from the hearing be provided for the purpose of having a 
transcript of the hearing prepared. On June 11, 2002, Complainant filed Complainant's 
Response to Respondent's Petition for Review. Complainant received a copy of the transcript of 
the proceedings on August 2, 2002. On August 13, 2002, Respondent filed a Memorandum in 
Support of Petition for Review. On August 26, Complainant filed Complainant's Response to 
Respondent's Memorandum in Support of Petition for Review. On September 15, Respondent 
filed a Reply Memorandum of Respondent in Support of Petition for Review. On September 26, 
2002, the insurance commissioner designated the undersigned, as provided in U.C.A. Section 63-
46b-12(2) and U.A.C. Rule R590-160-8C, to handle Respondent's request for agency review. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The standards for agency review correspond to the standards for judicial review of formal 
adjudicative proceedings, as set forth in U.C.A. Subsection 63-46b-16(4). The applicable 
standards in this review are 
(d) the agency has erroneously interpreted or applied the law; [and] 
(g) the agency action is based upon a determination of fact, made or implied by the 
agency that is not supported by substantial evidence when viewed in light of the whole record 
before the court; 
Substantial evidence is that quantum and quality of relevant evidence that is adequate to 
convince a reasonable mind to support a conclusion. 
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STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
Should the order issued by the presiding officer be set aside because he made incorrect 
findings of fact and conclusions of law? Specifically, the respondent alleges in his Petition for 
Review that the presiding officer's order be set-aside on any of the following grounds: 
1. The discipline imposed is disproportionate to the offense alleged. 
2. Standard of proof language used by presiding officer is unknown as the standard is not in 
rule cited. 
3. Burden is on Complainant to prove that product sold was unauthorized insurance, not on 
Respondent to prove that product sold was exempted from Complainant regulation. 
4. Complainant's declarations of fact are not supported by substantial evidence. 
a. Complainant's declaration that product sold was unauthorized insurance is not 
supported by substantial evidence; 
b. Complainant's declaration that Respondent knew or should have known that product 
sold was unauthorized insurance not supported by substantial evidence; and 
c. Complainant's declaration that product sold was insurance not supported by 
substantial evidence. 
DISCUSSION OF FACTS AND ISSUES 
Issue 1: The discipline imposed is disproportionate to the offense alleged. 
The selling of unauthorized insurance is a very serious allegation because the 
purchaser has no recourse to the normal consumer protections available to the purchaser of an 
authorized product or a product exempt from regulation. Respondent was named in a Cease and 
Desist Order issued December 6, 2001, against an unauthorized insurer and was specifically 
enjoined to immediately cease and desist any assistance to any person doing an unauthorized 
insurance business in the State of Utah. Any assistance was defined as soliciting, marketing, or 
proposing to make an insurance contract, taking, receiving or forwarding an application for 
insurance, collecting or receiving, in full or in part, any insurance premium, issuing or delivering 
an insurance policy or other evidence of an insurance contract, or publishing or disseminating 
any advertisement or information for insurance for any unauthorized insurer. In January and 
February of 2002, in violation of the December 6, 2001 cease and desist order, the Respondent 
assisted another unauthorized insurer to do business in the State of Utah by soliciting, marketing, 
taking and forwarding applications for insurance, and receiving insurance premium. 
Issue 2: Standard of proof language used by presiding officer is unknown as the standard 
is not in rule cited. 
The presiding officer incorrectly cited the 1999 version of the rule. The paragraph cited 
is identical to the appropriate paragraph in the 2000 version of the rule. 
R590-160-5. Rules Applicable to All Proceedings - effective February 3,1994; notice 
of continuation January 1, 1999 
J. Standard of Proof. All issues of fact in administrative proceedings before the 
commissioner shall be decided upon the basis of a preponderance of the evidence standard. 
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R590-160-5. Rules Applicable to All Proceedings - effective November 14,2000 
(10) Standard of Proof. AH issues of fact in administrative proceedings before the 
commissioner shall be decided upon the basis of a preponderance of the evidence standard. 
Issue 3: Burden is on Complainant to prove that product sold was unauthorized 
insurance, not on Respondent to prove that product sold was exempted from Complainant 
regulation. 
Producers marketing insurance products in this state are expected to understand the laws 
and rules regulating the business of insurance in Utah. U.C.A. Section 31A-4-106 states a 
prohibition to arranging health insurance not authorized under Chapters 5, 7, 8, 9, or 14 and 
provides a methodology to obtain a preemption from regulation under Section 514 of the 
Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) or other federal law. U.C.A. 
Section 31 A-15-102 prohibits persons from assisting in the illegal placement of insurance with 
an unauthorized insurer. U.C.A. Section 31A-23-405 prohibits assisting any person purporting 
to be exempt from state insurance regulation under Section 514 of ERISA unless that person has 
rebutted the presumption of jurisdiction under U.C.A. Section 31A-1-105. 
The Complainant stated in its original Complaint that the health insurance offered by 
Respondent was unauthorized insurance. The Complainant, in its Emergency Proceeding 
Suspension of License, identified Privilege Care as the unauthorized insurer that the Respondent 
had assisted. The Complainant also stated in testimony during Respondent's hearing that 
Privilege Care was conducting business as an unauthorized insurer. Respondent offered no 
evidence, other than testimony that the health insurance marketed by Respondent was a benefit 
provided through membership in a professional employer organization (PEO), to refute the 
Complainant's finding that the health insurance offered through the PEO was unauthorized 
insurance. The fact that the health insurance was being marketed through a PEO does not 
exempt the health insurance from having to comply with state insurance laws and regulations or 
qualify for a Section 514 of ERISA exemption. All health insurance offered in this state, no 
matter in what context it is marketed, must comply with state insurance laws and regulations or 
qualify for a Section 514 of ERISA exemption. 
Issue 4a: Complainant's declaration that product sold was unauthorized insurance is not 
supported by substantial evidence. 
Respondent correctly stated that the Complainant does not have jurisdiction over 
professional employer organizations. Privilege Care PEO as a PEO is not under the jurisdiction 
of the Complainant. However, the health insurance offered by Privilege Care PEO is subject to 
the Complainant's jurisdiction unless Privilege Care PEO perfects a preemption of jurisdiction 
under Section 514 of ERISA. Respondent did not present evidence Privilege Care PEO had a 
preemption of jurisdiction. Complainant presented substantial evidence that Privilege Care PEO 
was offering health insurance and the health insurance offered was not underwritten by an 
admitted health insurer. 
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Issue 4b: Complainant's declaration tliat Respondent knew or should have known that 
product sold was unauthorized insurance not supported by substantial evidence. 
Respondent is an experienced life and health insurance producer as evidenced by his 
having been licensed for twenty-seven years. He admits to not knowing much about ERISA or 
unauthorized insurance. On December 6, 2001, Respondent was named in a Cease and Desist 
order because of his involvement with assisting an unauthorized insurer. The cease and desist 
order should have indicated to the Respondent that he did not know what constituted assisting an 
unauthorized insurer and heightened his need to learn what constituted unauthorized insurance to 
protect himself and his clients. Producers have an obligation to understand what constitutes 
assisting an unauthorized insurer and to understand what constitutes unauthorized insurance. 
Producers, therefore, must do any necessary research to determine that any insurance they 
choose to present to their clients is either issued by an insurer authorized to do the business of 
insurance in this state or is preempted from state insurance regulation. 
Shortly after the December 6,2001 Cease and Desist Order was effective, Respondent 
was solicited by persons named with him in the December 6, 2001 Cease and Desist Order to 
market health insurance to replace the health insurance issued by the unauthorized insurer named 
in the Cease and Desist Order. Respondent testified that he did not understand the replacement 
product he was selling and that he relied on information supplied by the same persons that had 
assured him that the previous health insurance had been authorized health insurance when it fact 
it was not. Respondent testified that he did not do independent research to determine if Privilege 
Care PEO was offering health insurance provided by an authorized insurer or health insurance 
preempted from Complaint's regulation under Section 514 of ERISA until after the Complainant 
indicated to him that Privilege Care PEO was not an authorized insurer. Evidence presented in 
the record clearly shows that sufficient indicators were present to alert Respondent that the health 
insurance offered through Privilege Care PEO was not authorized insurance. Respondent failed 
to learn what constituted unauthorized insurance and to do the necessary research to ensure the 
replacement health insurance offered through Privilege Care PEO was not being issued by an 
unauthorized insurer. Ignorance of the law is not an excuse for violating the law. 
Issue 4c: Complainant's declaration that product sold was insurance not supported by 
substantial evidence. 
Respondent's clients testified that they understood they were being offered health 
insurance to replace the health insurance previously sold to them by the Respondent. Materials 
from Privilege Care PEO introduced into evidence and used by the Respondent in his 
presentations to his clients clearly indicate that the product includes health insurance. The 
completed forms introduced into evidence as completed by the Respondent at the time of 
presentation to his clients were health insurance forms. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The order by the presiding officer should not be set aside because he made incorrect 
findings of fact and conclusions of law. 
a. The discipline imposed is not disproportionate to the offense alleged. 
(1) Respondent, by assisting an unauthorized insurer, placed his clients at substantial 
financial risk because health insurance issued by unauthorized insurers is not protected by the 
consumer protections provided for health insurance issued by an authorized insurer. 
(2) Placing clients at substantia] financial risk is a very serious violation of a producer's 
obligations to his clients. 
(3) Respondent was named in a Cease and Desist Order issued December 6, 2001, against 
an unauthorized insurer and was specifically enjoined to immediately cease and desist any 
assistance to any person doing an unauthorized insurance business in the State of Utah. 
(4) Respondent assisted another unauthorized insurer to do business in the State of Utah 
by soliciting, marketing, taking and forwarding applications for insurance, and receiving 
insurance premium during January and February of 2002. 
(5) Respondent violated the terms of the commissioner's December 2001 Cease and 
Desist Order by assisting an unauthorized insurer during January and February 2002. 
(6) Violation of a commissioner's order is a very serious breach of a producer's 
responsibilities. 
(8) Respondent is an experienced insurance producer as evidenced by his having been 
licensed for twenty-seven years. 
(7) The penalty imposed by the presiding officer was not disproportionate based on the 
Respondent's experience as an insurance producer, the very serious violation of his obligations 
to his clients, and the very serious breach of his responsibilities as a producer. 
b. Standard of proof language cited by the presiding officer does not set an unknown 
standard. 
(1) The presiding officer incorrectly cited the 1999 version of the rule. 
(2) The standard of proof language in the 2000 version of the rule is identical to the 
standard of proof language in the 1999 version of the rule. 
(3) The incorrect rule citation by the presiding officer did not impose a different standard 
of proof so the Respondent's statement that the standard of proof is unknown and thereby sets an 
unknown standard is incorrect. 
c. The order by the presiding officer should not be set aside because burden is on 
Complainant to prove that product sold was unauthorized insurance, not on Respondent to prove 
that product sold was exempted from Complainant regulation. 
(1) The Complainant stated in its original complaint that the product offered by 
Respondent was unauthorized insurance. 
(2) The Complainant, in its Emergency Proceeding Suspension of License, specifically 
identified Privilege Care as the unauthorized insurer that the Respondent had assisted. 
(3) A defense against the Complainant's allegation of assisting an unauthorized insurer is 
to prove incorrect the Complainant's declaration that the insurer being assisted by the 
Respondent is an unauthorized insurer. 
(4) The burden of proof was rightly placed on the Respondent. 
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d. Complainant's declarations of fact are supported by substantial evidence. 
(1) Complainant's declaration that the health insurance marketed by the Respondent was 
unauthorized insurance is supported by substantial evidence. 
(i) Respondent did not present evidence that Privilege Care PEO had a preemption of 
jurisdiction under Section 514 of ERISA or that the health insurance offered through Privilege 
Care PEO was issued by an authorized insurer. 
(ii) Complainant presented substantial evidence that Privilege Care PEO was offering 
health insurance and the health insurance offered was not issued by an authorized health insurer. 
(iii) The Complainant's declaration that the health insurance marketed by the Respondent 
was unauthorized insurance is supported by substantial evidence. 
(2) Complainant's declaration that Respondent knew or should have known that health 
insurance marketed by the Respondent was unauthorized insurance is supported by substantial 
evidence. 
(i) Respondent is an experienced health and life insurance producer as evidenced by his 
having been licensed for twenty-seven years. 
(ii) As an experienced health and life producer, Respondent has an obligation to 
understand what constitutes assisting an unauthorized insurer and what constitutes unauthorized 
insurance. 
(iii) Evidence presented in the record clearly shows that sufficient indicators were present 
to alert Respondent that the health insurance offered through Privilege Care PEO was 
unauthorized insurance. 
(iv) Respondent failed to learn what constitutes assisting an unauthorized insurer and to 
do the necessary research to ensure the health insurance offered through Privilege Care PEO was 
authorized insurance. 
(v) Complainant's declaration that Respondent knew or should have known that health 
insurance marketed by the Respondent was unauthorized insurance is supported by substantial 
evidence. 
(3) Complainant's declaration that health insurance marketed by the Respondent was 
insurance is supported by substantial evidence. 
(i) Respondent's clients testified that they understood they were being offered health 
insurance to replace the health insurance previously sold to them by the Respondent. 
(ii) Materials from Privilege Care PEO introduced into evidence and used by the 
Respondent in his presentations to his clients clearly indicate that the product includes health 
insurance. 
(iii) The completed forms introduced into evidence as completed by the Respondent at 
the time of presentation to his clients were health insurance forms. 
(iv) Complainant's declaration that health insurance marketed by the Respondent was 
insurance is supported by substantial evidence. 
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ORDER ON REVIEW 
Based on the above Findings of Fact and Conclusion of Law and a review of the record in 
the maner, Respondent's request to set aside the presiding officer's Order on Hearing is hereby 
denied. 
This order constitutes a final order of the Commissioner in the proceeding and any party 
aggrieved by the order may seek judicial review by filing a petition for judicial review with 
appropriate appellate court within thirty days after the date the order is issued. 
Dated this 3 LT day of October 2002. 
E. Braun, Jr. 
distant Insurance Commissioner 
Designee of the Commissioner 
I hereby adopt the analysis, findings of fact and conclusions of law, and the order of the 
designee as my Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order on Review in this matter. 
>t,lM*X, 
Merwin U. Stewart 
Insurance Commissioner 
"ffi JVJIMHUJT 
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ADDENDUM "C" 
R590-] 60-4(2) oi the Utah Administrative Code 
R590-160-5(10) of the Utah Administrative Code 
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(10) Standard of Proof. All issues of fact in admin-
istrative proceedings before the commissioner shall be 
decided upon the basis of a preponderance of the 
evidence standard. 
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ADDENDUM "D" 
U.C.A. § 31A-1-301(63) and (125) 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
(63) (a) "Insurance" means: 
(i) an arrangement, contract, or plan for the transfer of a risk 
or risks from one or more persons to one or more other persons; or 
(ii) an arrangement, contract, or plan for the distribution of a 
risk or risks among a group of persons that includes the person 
seeking to distribute that person's risk, 
(b) "Insurance" includes: 
(i) risk distributing arrangements providing for compensation 
or replacement for damages or loss through the provision of 
services or benefits in kind; 
(ii) contracts of guaranty or suretyship entered into by the 
guarantor or surety as a business and not as merely incidental to 
a business transaction; and 
(iii) plans in which the risk does not rest upon the person who 
makes the arrangements, but with a class of persons who have 
agreed to share it. 
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(125) (a) "Unauthorized insurer," "unadmitted insurer," or "nonadmit-
ted insurer" means an insurer: 
(i) not holding a valid certificate of authority to do an insur-
ance business in this state; or 
(ii) transacting business not authorized by a valid certificate, 
(b) "Admitted insurer" or "authorized insurer" means an insurer: 
(i) holding a valid certificate of authority to do an insurance 
business in this state; and 
(ii) transacting business as authorized by a valid certificate. 
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ADDENDUM "E" 
U.C.A. Title 58, Chapter 59 
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58-59-101. Short title. 
This chapter is known as "the "Professional Employer Organization Licens-
ing Act." 
58-59-] 02. Definitions. 
In addition to the definitions in Section 58-1-302, as used in this chapter: 
(13 "Adjusted net worth" means stockholder's equity determined in 
accordance with generally accepted accounting principles, increased by 
the amount of obligations subordinated to claims ofgenerai creditors with 
a remaining term to maturity in excess of three years, and mandatory 
redeemable preferred stock with a remaining term to redemption in excess 
of three years and decreased by assets shown on the balance sheet in the 
form of receivables, loans, advances or similar types of assets receivable 
from owners, shareholders, partners or officers of the company and 
decreased by intangible assets not acquired in an arm's length transac-
tion. The owners of the PEO may provide personal or corporate financial 
statements together with personal or corporate guaranty agreements to 
supplement the "Adjusted Net Worth" of the PEO. 
(2) "Board" means the Professional Employer Organization Board cre-
ated in Section 58-59-201. 
(3) "Change in life count" means the percentage change in the number 
of lives on a health plan from the beginning to the end of the run-out 
period. 
(4) "Client" or "client company" means a person or entity that leases any 
or all of its regular employees from a professional employer organization. 
(5) "Coemployee" means a person who is an employee of a professional 
employer organization and of a client company. 
(6) "Employment agreement" means the written agreement between a 
professional employer organization and each of its employees who are 
employed for the purpose of being coemployees to client companies. 
(7) "Engage in practice as a professional employer organization" means 
to hold oneself out as a professional employer organization, to coemploy an 
employee with another person, or to receive any consideration for provid-
ing professional employer sendees or to expect payment of any consider-
ation for providing professional employer services. 
(8) "Excess Reserves" means assets of a health benefit plan .less all 
liabilities including accrued liabilities of the health benefit plan as shown 
on a financial statement of the plan prepared according to generally 
accepted accounting practices. 
(9) "Medical trend" means the medical component of the most current 
Consumer Price Index (CPI) 12 month change as of the last month that the 
run-out is calculated. 
(10) "Professional employer agreement" means the written agreement 
between a professional employer organization and a client company in 
accordance with which the professional employer organization establishes 
the basis for a coemployment relationship with the client company's 
employees. 
(11) (a) "Professional employer organization" or "PEO" means an orga-
nization who by contract agrees to employ a majority of a client's 
workforce where employer responsibilities for those employees are in 
fact allocated between or shared by the professional employer orga-
nization and the client. 
(b) The employer responsibilities are considered to be allocated 
between or shared by the professional employer organization and the 
client whenever the agreement between the client and the profes-
sional employer organization expressly provides for such allocation or 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain e rors.
(c) The term "professional employer organization arrangement"' 
shall be liberally construed so as to include any and all arrangement!* 
meeting the criteria for professional employer organizations regard?? 
less of the term used. 
(d) The following arrangements are not professional employer 
organization arrangements for purposes of this chapter: 
(i) arrangements wherein a person, whose principal business 
activity is not entering into professional employer organization 
arrangements, shares employees with a commonly owned com-
pany within the meaning of Sections 414(b) and (c) of the Internal 
Revenue Code of 1986, as amended, and which does not hold itself 
out as a professional employer organization; 
(ii) arrangements by which a person assumes responsibility for 
the product produced or service performed by that person or his 
agents and retains and exercises primary direction and control 
over the work performed by the individuals whose services are 
supplied under the arrangements; 
(iii) a temporary help arrangement, whereby an organization 
hires its own employees and assigns them to a client to support or 
supplement the client's workforce in special work situations such 
as employee absences, temporary skill shortages, seasonal 
workloads, and special assignments and projects; provided, how-
ever, that the temporary help arrangement excludes arrange-
ments where the majority of the client's work force has been 
assigned by a temporary help organization for a period of more 
than 12 consecutive months; and 
(iv) any person otherwise subject to licensure under this chap-
ter if, during any fiscal year of the person, the total gross wages 
paid to employees employed by the person in this state during 
such period under one or more professional employer organiza-
tion arrangements do not exceed h% of the total gross wages paid 
to all employees employed by the person during the same period, 
and provided further, that the person does not advertise or hold 
itself out to the public as providing arrangements denominated as 
"professional employer** or "employee leasing" in this state. 
(12) "Represent oneself as a professional employer organization" means 
to hold oneself cut by any means as a professional employer organization. 
(13) "Run-out' means claims paid during the six-month period at the 
fiscal year end of the PEO for dates of service prior to that same six-month 
period, less amounts reimbursed or to be reimbursed by a reinsurance 
carrier or reimbursements from any other source for such claims. 
(14) Temporary employee/" as may be further defined by rule, means 
an individual who is an employee of, registered for temporary assigmment 
by, or otherwise associated with a temporary help company that engages 
in the assignment of individuals as temporary full-time or part-time 
personnel to fill assignments with a finite ending date to another inde-
pendent entity. 
(15) "Temporary help company,'* as may be further defined by rule, 
means a person or entity that provides temporary employees to fill 
assignments with a finite ending date to another independent entity in 
special, unusual, seasonal, or temporary skill shortage situations. 
(16) "Total adjusted liabilities'* means total liabilities as stated in an 
audited financial statement less obligations subordinated to claims of 
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(17) "Unlawful conduct" is as defined in Sections 58-1-501 and 58-59-
501. 
(18) "Unprofessional conduct" is as defined in Sections 58-1-501 and 
58-59-502. 
PART 2 
PROFESSIONAL EMPLOYER ORGANIZATION BOARD 
58-59-201. Board. 
(1) There is created the Professional Employer Organization Board consist-
ing of: 
(a) three members who are owners or officers of separate licensed 
professional employer organizations within this state; 
(b) one member who is an owner or officer of a client company; and 
(c) one member from the general public. 
(2) The board shall be appointed and serve in accordance with Section 
58-1-201. 
(3) (a) The duties and responsibilities of the board shall be in accordance 
with Sections 58-1-201 through 58-1-203. 
(b) The board shall designate one of its members on a permanent or 
rotating basis to: 
(i) assist the division in reviewing complaints concerning the 
unlawful or unprofessional conduct of a licensee; and 
(ii) advise the division in its investigation of these complaints. 
(c) A board member who has , under Subsection (3)(b), reviewed a 
complaint or advised in its investigation is disqualified from participating 
with the board when the board seizes as a presiding officer in an 
adjudicative proceeding concerning the complaint. 
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58-59-301. License required — License issuance. 
(1) A license is required to engage in practice as a professional employer 
organization, except as specifically provided in Section 58-1-307 or 58-59-305. 
(2) The division shall issue to persons qualified under the provision of this 
chapter a license as a professional employer organization. 
58-59*302. Qualifications for l icensure. 
Each applicant for licensure as a professional employer organization shall: 
(1) submit an application in a form prescribed by the division; 
(2) pay a fee as determined by the department under Section 63-38-3.2; 
(3) provide documentation that the applicant is properly registered 
with: 
(a) the Division of Corporations and Commercial Code; 
(b) the Department of Workforce Services, for the purposes of Title 
35A, Chapter 4, Employment Security Act; 
(c) the State Tax Commission; and 
(d) the Internal Revenue Service; 
(4) submit to the division a certified audit performed by an independent 
certified public accountant showing at least an adjusted net worth of 
$50,000 or 5% of total adjusted liabilities, whichever is greater; 
(5) for the purpose of having criminal background checks, provide to the 
division, the names of: 
(a) all individuals who have control of or a controlling interest in, 
as defined in Section 16-10a-102, the professional employer organiza-
tion; 
(b) all officers and directors of the professional employer organiza-
tion; and 
(c) all other individuals who have signatory authority over fidu-
ciary funds held by the professional employer organization; and 
(6) provide evidence that the responsible managers of the professional 
employer organization have education and experience in the conduct of 
business that demonstrate a reasonable expectation that the professional 
employer organization will be managed with the skill and expertise 
necessary to protect the interests of its employees, client companies, and 
the public. 
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58-59-303. Term of license — Expirat ion — Renewal. 
(1) The division shall issue each license under this chapter in accordance 
with a one-year renewal cycle established by rule. The division may by rule 
extend or shorten a renewal period by as much as six months to stagger the 
renewal cycles it administers. 
(2) At the time of renewal the licensee shall show satisfactory documenta-
tion of compliance with Subsections 58-59-302(1) through (4) and Sections 
58-59-306 and 58-59-310. 
(3) Each license automatically expires on the expiration date shown on the 
license unless renewed by the licensee in accordance with Section 58-1-308. 
58-59-304. Repealed. 
58-59-305. Exemptions from l icensure. 
In addition to the exemptions from licensure in Section 58-1-307 the 
following are exempt from licensure under this chapter: 
(1) related companies under common ownership that are not individu-
ally considered professional employer organizations under this chapter 
which combine employees of one commonly owned company with employ-
ees of another commonly owned company on either a temporary or regular 
basis; and 
(2) a professional employer organization, which is not domiciled in this 
state, and which employs less than 25 employees working within this 
state. 
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58-59-306. Financial filing requ i rements . 
(1) A professional employer organization shall submit to the division: 
(a) on a quarterly basis, a statement from an independent certified 
public accountant, that all federal, state, and local withholding ta^es, 
unemployment taxes, FJCA taxes, workers' compensation premiums, and 
employee benefit plan premiums have been paid; and 
(b) on an annual basis, audited financial statements prepared by an 
independent certified public accountant, in accordance with generally 
accepted accounting practices, that include a review of the payment of all 
federal, state, and local withholding taxes, unemployment taxes, F1CA 
taxes, workers' compensation premiums, and employee benefit plan pre-
miums. 
(2) The audited financial statements required by Subsection (1) shall be 
adequate for the state and its political subdivisions as long as: 
(a) there are no qualifications given in the opinion that the CPA 
considers material enough to question the stability of the PEO as a going 
concern; and 
(b) the PEO complies with Subsection 58-59-302(4). 
58-59-307. Records and repor t s protected. 
Notwithstanding Title 63, Chapter 2, Government Records Access and 
Management Act, financial information submitted to the division by or at the 
request and direction of an applicant or licensee for the purpose of supporting 
a representation of financial responsibility is confidential, is not for public 
inspection, and is not subject to discovery in civil or administrative proceed-
ings. 
58-59-308. No guarantee. 
By licensing and regulating professional employer organizations under this 
chapter, the state: 
(1) does not guarantee any right, claim, or defense of any professional 
employer organization, client company, coemployee, or other person; 
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(2) does not guarantee the financial responsibility or solvency of any 
professional employer organization; and 
(3) does not waive any right, claim, or defense of immunity that it may 
have under Title 63, Chapter 30, Utah Governmental Immunity Act, or 
other law. 
58-59-309. State licensing provisions not exempted. 
(1) Nothing in this chapter exempts a client of a PEO. nor a coemployee, 
from any state, local, or federal license or registration requirement. 
(2) Any individual who must be licensed, registered, or certified according to 
law and who is a coemployee of a PEO and a client is considered an employee 
of the client for purposes of that license, registration, or certification. 
(3) A PEO does not engage in an occupation, trade, or profession that is 
licensed, certified, or otherwise regulated by a governmental entity solely by 
entering into a professional employer arrangement with a client company or a 
coemployee. 
58-59-310. Health benefit p lans . 
If a PEO offers any self-funded or partially self-funded health benefit plan, 
the PEO shall: 
(1) use a third-party administrator licensed by the Utah State Insur-
ance Department; 
(2) hold all self-funded or partially self-funded plan assets, including 
participant contributions, in a trust account; 
(3) provide to the division a list of the trustees of the plan; 
(4) provide to the division a statement from a certified actuary that: 
(a) the plan maintains stop loss insurance that: 
(i) has an aggregate stop loss provision; and 
(ii) has a specific attachment point on an individual person, per 
plan year, in an amount not greater than $60,000 if the plan has 
500 covered coemployees, $90,000 if the plan has between 501 
and 3 000 covered coemployees. $125,000 if the plan has over 1000 
covered coemployees, and $250,000 if the plan has more than 
]000 covered coemployees and the plan has in reserves 100% of 
the statutory liability, except that the limits of the attaichment 
points shall increase annually by twice the percentage of the 
medical trend beginning with the licenses given or renewed in the 
year 2004; and 
(b) the plan has at least 50% of its statutory liability held in the 
plan trust within two months of the license renewal date where the 
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plan's statutory "liability is calculated as the run-out multiplied by the 
change in life count multiplied by the medical trend; 
(5) provide to the division a statement from a certified actuary indicat-
ing the run-out, the change in life count, the medical trend, and the 
statutory liability of the plan, where the plan's statutory liability is the 
run-out increased by the change in life count, then increased by the 
medical trend; and 
(6) provide an audited financial statement evidencing that the PEO's 
plan has excess resewes of at least 50% of its statutory liability held in the 
plan trust as of the end of the fiscal year of the PEO, and if the excess 
reser\7es are not met. the PEO may supplement the proof that it has come 
into compliance with the requirement. 
PART 4 
DENIAL OF LICENSURE 
58-59-401. Grounds for denial of license or renewal — 
Disciplinary proceedings* 
(1) If at the time of renewal, a PEO fails to comply with the requirements of 
licensure for any reason, the division may put the PEO on probation until such 
time as the PEO comes into compliance with the licensure requirements or 90 
days from the license renewal date, whichever comes first. If the PEO fails to 
cure any default within 90 days of the license renewal date, the division may 
refuse to renew the license of a licensee. 
(2) The division may refuse to issue a license to an applicant, revoke, 
suspend, restrict, or place on probation the license of a licensee, issue a public 
or private reprimand to a licensee, and issue cease and desist orders in 
accordance with Section 58-1-401. 
58-59-402. Court intervention. 
If a professional employer organization is operating without a license, the 
division may file a complaint in district court asking for injunctive relief or any 
other remedy considered appropriate by the court. 
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PART 5 
UNLAAWUL AND UNPROFESSIONAL 
CONDUCT — PENALTIES 
58-59-501. Unlawful conduct . 
Unlawful conduct includes: 
(1) engaging in practice as a professional employer organization with-
out a license; 
(2) offering an employee a self-funded medical program, unless: 
(a) the program provides its benefits under an employee benefit 
plan that complies with 29 U.S.C. Sec. 1143 et seq.; and 
(b) the program is maintained for the sole benefit of participating 
coemployees; 
(3) misrepresenting tha t any self-funded medical program it offers is 
other than self-funded; 
(4) offering to its employees any self-funded or partially self-funded 
medical plan without delivering to each plan part icipant a summary plan 
description tha t accurately describes terms of the plan, including disclo-
sure tha t the plan is self-funded or partially self-funded; 
(5) providing coemployees to any client company under any provision, 
term, or condition that is not contained in a clearly written agreement 
between the professional employer organization and client company; 
(6) any willful, fraudulent, or deceitful act by a licensee, caused by a 
licensee, or at a licensee's direction, that causes material injury to a client 
company or coemployee of a client company; 
(7) failing to maintain or ensure that client companies maintain in full 
force and effect required workers' compensation insurance on all 
coemployees in accordance with Utah law pursuant to Section 34A-2-103; 
(8) failing to pay in a timely manner any federal or state income tax 
withholding, F1CA, unemployment tax, employee insurance benefit pre-
mium, workers' compensation premium, or other obligation due and 
payable directly as a result of engaging in business as a professional 
employer organization; and 
(9) failing to comply with federal law regarding any employee benefit 
offered to an employee. 
58-59-502. Unprofessional conduct. 
Unprofessional conduct includes: 
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(1) failing to maintain current lease agreements and employment 
agreements in appropriate form and content as required under this 
chapter; 
(2) failing to inform the division of a change in ownership, in the 
address of its owners or officers, or in its principal business address or 
change in any responsible manager of the professional employer organi-
zation who has signatory authority over company funds within ten days 
after the change; 
(3) failing within ten days to notify the division of the failure to pay 
when due an amount exceeding $5,000 of any of the following obligations: 
any federal or state income tax, withholding tax, F1CA, unemployment 
tax, employee insurance benefit premium, or worker compensation pre-
mium; and 
(4) any of the following events unless the licensee first obtains written 
approval from the division for that event: 
(a) the sale or transfer of a majority of the professional employer 
contracts of the licensee; 
(b) the sale or transfer of a majority of the physical assets of the 
licensee; 
(c) the sale or transfer of more than 25% of the ownership interest 
of a licensee by any means including the sale, transfer, or issuance of 
a member interest in a limited liability company, the sale, transfer, or 
issuance of a member interest in a partnership, the sale, transfer, or 
issuance of a ownership interest in a licensee in any other manner 
other than the sale or transfer of publicly traded shares of a corpora-
tion affected through a public exchange or market; and 
(d) entering into one or more contracts, other than professional 
employer agreements with clients, which commits the licensee to 
make future payments to any person or persons in amounts which in 
total exceed the equity of the business for payment of service provided 
to or for the licensee. 
58-59-503. Penal ty for unlawful conduct. 
(1) Any person who violates Subsections 58-59-501(1) through (4) is guilty of 
a third degree felony. 
(2) Any person who violates Subsections 58-59-501 (5) through (9) is guilty 
of a class A misdemeanor. 
(3) Any person who has engaged in unlawful conduct may be assessed the 
costs associated with the investigations, disciplinary proceedings, court pro-
ceedings, or other actions to enforce the provisions of this act. 
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ADDENDUM "F" 
Due Process Clauses 
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Section 1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal 
protection.] 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and 
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United 
States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall 
make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or 
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any 
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without 
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdic-
tion the equal protection of the laws. 
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Sec. 7. [Due process of law.] 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, 
without due process of law. 3896 
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